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CORPORATIONS, SOCIETY, AND THE STATE:
A DEFENSE OF THE CORPORATE TAX
Reuven S. Avi-Yonah*
"[T]he power to tax involves the power to destroy."1
- Chief Justice John Marshall
"The power to tax is not the power to destroy while this Court
sits."
2
- Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.
* Irwin I. Cohn Professor of Law, University of Michigan. B.A. (History), Hebrew
University, 1983; Ph.D. (History), Harvard University, 1986; J.D., Harvard Law
School, 1989. I would like to thank Bill Andrews, Steve Bank, Michael Barr, Suzie
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Zolt, and participants in workshops at the Columbia, Harvard, Michigan, NYU,
Northwestern, and UCLA Law Schools, at the Brookings Institution, and in the 2003
RegNet conference at Australian National University and the 2004 tax history confer-
ence at Cambridge University. Many thanks to Amir Chenchinski for meticulous re-
search assistance.
'McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316,431 (1819).
2Panhandle Oil Co. v. Mississippi ex rel. Knox, 277 U.S. 218, 223 (1928) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting).
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INTRODUCTION
C ORPORATIONS are both everywhere and nowhere. They
are everywhere, first and foremost, on the economic scene: a
large percentage of economic activity in the United States is effec-
tuated through the corporate form.3 But the reach of corporations
is far broader than that. Many of our other institutions, including
universities, churches, hospitals, and other non-profit organiza-
tions, are in corporate form. Other salient features of our society,
such as representative democracy, originated from the use of the
3William G. Roy, Socializing Capital: The Rise of the Large Industrial Corporation
in America 5 (1997).
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corporate form in medieval England.4 Even the idea of the state it-
self originated in Roman and Medieval legal notions about corpo-
rate bodies.5
And yet corporations are nowhere. The leading academic theory
about corporations, the nexus of contracts (or contractarian) the-
ory, posits that corporations do not really exist; they are merely a
convenient connection point for a bundle of relationships between
shareholders, bondholders, employees, customers, and others.
Any useful academic analysis of the corporation must begin by de-
nying its existence and looking at the various groups of people in-
teracting through the corporation. This is the aggregate view of the
corporation that sees it primarily as the amalgam of its owners.
It was not always so. Around 1909, when the corporate income
tax was first adopted, there was a variety of corporate theories, and
some of them posited that corporations had a real existence sepa-
rate from both shareholders and the state. Of course, the corpora-
tion itself was but a legal fiction, but corporate management was
real, and the power of corporate management over employees,
shareholders, and society at large was real as well.
The goal of this Article is to examine the relationship among
corporations, society, and the state through the lens of the corpo-
rate income tax. The corporate income tax offers a unique oppor-
tunity to examine this broader issue because, first, it is one way in
which the state intervenes directly in the affairs of corporations;
and second, because various theories of why the corporate income
tax exists illustrate the dichotomy between the real and aggregate
views of the corporation. When the corporate tax was first adopted
in 1909, the real view was dominant and the tax was conceived
primarily as a device to regulate corporate management in relation
to other stakeholders and the state. Today, however, the aggregate
(nexus of contracts) view predominates, and the tax is seen primar-
ily as an indirect way of taxing shareholders.
' On representative democracy and its connection to the borough as a corporation
see, for example, Gaines Post, Studies in Medieval Legal Thought (1964); Brian Tier-
ney, Religion, Law, and the Growth of Constitutional Thought 1150-50 (1982).
On the Roman origins see P.W. Duff, Personality in Roman Private Law (1938);
Otto Gierke, Associations and Law: The Classical and Early Christian Stages 95-142
(George Heiman ed. & trans., 1977); Fritz Schultz, Classical Roman Law 86-102
(1951). On medieval developments, see Ernst H. Kantorowicz, The King's Two Bod-
ies: A Study in Medieval Political Theology 273-313 (1957).
20041 1195
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This Article is divided into four parts. Part I will examine the
current justifications for the existence of the corporate tax. This
examination is needed for two reasons. First, it is necessary be-
cause some academics and practitioners (including the former Sec-
retary of the Treasury) dispute the need for a corporate tax. Sec-
ond, it is necessary because certain practical trends (primarily
corporate tax shelters and tax competition) are eroding the existing
corporate tax base, and it is hard to mount a convincing normative
defense of the corporate tax against these trends without under-
standing why we need the tax in the first place. Part I will conclude
that the dominant current justifications for the tax are based on the
aggregate model and are fundamentally flawed, and that current
attempts to find alternative grounds for the tax are unconvincing as
well.
Part II will reconstruct the original reasons for the enactment of
the corporate tax in 1909 and will show that it was based on a real
theory of the corporation, and that the tax was viewed primarily as
a regulatory device to limit the power of management. In that way
it was different from an earlier corporate tax, the 1894 tax, which
was viewed primarily as a way of taxing shareholders.
Part III will begin the normative part of the Article by asking
whether the original motivation of the corporate tax has any con-
tinuing force today. It will argue that it does, both because the real
view is a better approximation of reality than the aggregate view,
and because managerial power is still an important issue. In fact,
the rise of multinational enterprises ("MNEs") is a new shift in the
relationship among corporations, society, and the state that re-
quires a re-examination of the relationship similar to that which
took place in 1909. The corporate tax (extended internationally)
can still play an important role in regulating that relationship.
Part IV will conclude by examining some of the policy implica-
tions of the above argument. In particular, it will argue that the
corporate tax should be retained and defended against both corpo-
rate tax shelters and tax competition. It also suggests that integra-
tion of the corporate and shareholder taxes, as partially adopted by
Congress in 2003, is not necessary to prevent "double taxation," al-
though it may perhaps be defended on different grounds.
1196 [Vol. 90:1193
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I. CURRENT JUSTIFICATIONS FOR THE CORPORATE TAX.
The corporate income tax is under attack. Secretary Paul
O'Neill, the former Secretary of the Treasury, announced that it
should be abolished,' and the current drive to eliminate the taxa-
tion of dividends can be seen as the first step toward that goal.7 A
significant number of tax academics have argued for repeal of the
tax.' Other academics have urged radical reform of the tax.9 And
no academic has in recent years mounted a serious, convincing
normative defense of why this cumbersome tax should be re-
tained."0
This lack of a normative justification for retaining the tax is im-
portant for three reasons. First, the corporate tax is very compli-
cated and imposes significant transaction costs on society. Many of
'John Hughes, Corporate Income Tax in O'Neill's Sights: Treasury Secretary
Hopes to End Levy, Wash. Post, May 20, 2001, at A7; see also Corporate Tax: Time
to Hiss: A Bad Tax Whose Time Has Gone, The Economist, Jan. 31, 2004, at 14.
' U.S. Treasury Dep't, Fact Sheet: The President's Proposal to End the Double Tax
on Corporate Earnings, at http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/kd3762.htm (Jan. 14,
2003) (on file with the Virginia Law Review Association).
'See, e.g., Joseph M. Dodge, A Combined Mark-to-Market and Pass-Through Cor-
porate-Shareholder Integration Proposal, 50 Tax L. Rev. 265, 266-67 (1995) (propos-
ing to integrate the corporate-shareholder income tax); Daniel Halperin, Fundamen-
tal Tax Reform, 48 Emory L.J. 809, 820-22 (1999) (proposing a combination of
changes including full indexation and corporate integration); Anthony P. Polito, Note,
A Proposal for an Integrated Income Tax, 12 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 1009, 1048
(1989) (arguing that integration would advance horizontal and vertical equity).
'See, e.g., Joseph Bankman, A Market-Value Based Corporate Income Tax, 68 Tax
Notes 1347, 1347-48 (1995) (discussing the operation of a market-value tax regime
that could replace the corporate tax); Michael S. Knoll, An Accretion Corporate In-
come Tax, 49 Stan. L. Rev. 1, 1 (1996) (proposing a corporate-level tax on the change
in market value of corporate securities).
" Some academics have defended the double tax on corporations, but they have fo-
cused on whether the tax should be integrated, not on whether it should exist in the
first place. See Terrence R. Chorvat, Apologia for the Double Taxation of Corporate
Income, 38 Wake Forest L. Rev. 239, 242-43 (2003); Jasper L. Cummings, Jr., "Taxing
Business Income Once": Where's the Beef? A Review and Critique of the Treasury
Integration Study, 54 Tax Notes 1391, 1395 (1992); Jeffrey L. Kwall, The Uncertain
Case Against the Double Taxation of Corporate Income, 68 N.C. L. Rev. 613, 616
(1990); Herwig J. Schlunk, I Come Not to Praise the Corporate Income Tax, But to
Save It, 56 Tax L. Rev. 329, 332-33 (2003). Other academics have proposed ways of
integrating while keeping the corporate tax in place. See Anthony P. Polito, Useful
Fictions: Debt and Equity Classification in Corporate Tax Law, 30 Ariz. St. L.J. 761,
794-810 (1998); George K. Yin, Corporate Tax Integration and the Search for the
Pragmatic Ideal, 47 Tax L. Rev. 431, 504-05 (1992).
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the best educated and most talented tax lawyers in this country de-
vote their careers to the intricacies of Subchapter C." Second, there
is a widespread consensus among economists that imposing a tax
only on certain business entities and not on others leads to signifi-
cant welfare losses to society as the tax drives business owners
away from their preferred form of organization.12 In the absence of
a good reason to have the tax, these two types of costs form a per-
suasive case for repeal.
Third, and perhaps most importantly, the corporate tax base is
being eroded in practice. Revenues from the corporate income tax
amounted to about a quarter of all federal tax revenues in 1965;"
today the tax accounts for less than a tenth of revenues, and that
number is declining.'4 There are two major reasons for this decline
in revenues in recent years, and neither of them results from a con-
scious decision by Congress to reduce the tax. 5 The first is the
"1 See Joel B. Slemrod & Marsha Blumenthal, The Income Tax Compliance Cost of
Big Business, 24 Pub. Fin. Q. 411, 435-36 (1996).
See Jane G. Gravelle & Laurence Kotlikoff, The Incidence and Efficiency Costs
of Corporate Taxation When Corporate and Noncorporate Firms Produce the
Same Good, 97 J. Pol. Econ. 749, 750-52 (1989); Austan Goolsbee, The Impact and
Inefficiency of the Corporate Income Tax: Evidence from State Organizational
Form Data (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research Working Paper No. w9141, Mar. 2002),
at http://www.nber.org/papers/w9141 (on file with the Virginia Law Review Associa-
tion). Integration reduces but does not eliminate these welfare losses, because under
most forms of integration there is still differential taxation of C corporations and
other entities. See Michael J. Graetz & Alvin C. Warren, Jr., Integration of Corporate
and Individual Income Taxes: An Introduction to the Issues, in Integration of the U.S.
Corporate and Individual Income Taxes: The Treasury Department and American
Law Institute Reports 3, 15-17 (Michael J. Graetz & Alvin C. Warren eds., 1998).
13 Decline of Corporate Tax Revenues: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Fin., 101st
Cong. 2 (1990) (statement of Sen. Moynihan); Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Globalization,
Tax Competition, and the Fiscal Crisis of the Welfare State, 113 Harv. L. Rev. 1573,
1619 (2000) [hereinafter Avi-Yonah, Globalization].
14Joel Friedman, The Decline of Corporate Income Tax Revenues 4 fig.1, at
http://www.cbpp.org/10-16-03tax.pdf (Oct. 24, 2003) (on file with the Virginia Law
Review Association).
" Corporate tax rates were higher before 1986 but the base was narrower, so that
the Tax Reform Act of 1986 (which reduced the rate from 46% to the current 34%)
actually raised taxes on corporations. S. Rep. No. 99-313, at 78 (1986); Michael J.
Graetz, The Decline (and Fall?) of the Income Tax 133 (1998); Jeffrey H. Birnbaum,
Showdown at Gucci Gulch, 40 Nat'l Tax J. 357 (1987). The effective tax rates today,
however, are close to what they were before 1986. See George K. Yin, How Much
Tax Do Large Public Corporations Pay?: Estimating the Effective Tax Rates of the
S&P 500, 89 Va. L. Rev. 1793, 1797 (2003) [hereinafter Yin, Effective Tax Rates];
Friedman, supra note 14, at 8 fig. 3.
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growth of a corporate tax shelter industry, in which some of Amer-
ica's best minds scour the Code for ways to reduce corporate tax
liabilities by various transactions and then sell these transactions
for high fees to corporate clients. 6 Estimates of the revenue loss
vary, but there is a consensus that it is significant and that the IRS
has so far not been able to stop it with the doctrinal weapons at
hand." The second reason for the decline in corporate tax revenues
is tax competition among countries to attract corporate invest-
ments, which has grown significantly in the last two decades. 8 This
competition enables companies like Intel to pay no tax at all on its
non-U.S. income. 9 The most recent manifestation of this trend has
been inversion transactions, in which U.S.-based corporations
nominally move their headquarters to a tax haven like Bermuda.
This type of transaction can result in a dramatic decrease in world-
wide effective tax rates for the inverting corporation."
The response to both of these trends has been attempts by Con-
gress and the IRS to combat corporate tax shelters domestically,2'
6 See, e.g., Joseph Bankman, The New Market in Corporate Tax Shelters, 83 Tax
Notes 1775, 1780-82 (1999); David A. Weisbach, The Failure of Disclosure as an Ap-
proach to Shelters, 54 SMU L. Rev. 73, 74 (2001); see also George K. Yin, Getting Se-
rious About Corporate Tax Shelters: Taking a Lesson from History, 54 SMU L. Rev.
209, 214 (2001)[hereinafter Yin, Tax Shelters] (describing legislative responses to tax
shelters).
" See Yin, Tax Shelters, supra note 16, at 216. The litigation record is mixed. See,
e.g., Compaq Computer Corp. v. Comm'r, 277 F.3d 778, 788 (5th Cir. 2001) (finding
economic substance and business purpose); United Parcel Serv. v. Comm'r, 254 F.3d
1014, 1020 (11th Cir. 2001) (same); ACM P'ship v. Comm'r, 157 F.3d 231,263 (3d Cir.
1998) (finding insufficient economic substance but allowing certain limited deductions
for actual economic losses).
"8 See Avi-Yonah, Globalization, supra note 13, at 1575-76; Julie Roin, Competition
and Evasion: Another Perspective on International Tax Competition, 89 Geo. L.J.
543, 546-49 (2001).
"Avi-Yonah, Globalization, supra note 13, at 1589.
2See Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, For Haven's Sake: Reflections on Inversion Transac-
tions, 95 Tax Notes 1793, 1794 (2002) [hereinafter Avi-Yonah, Haven's Sake]; Mihir
Desai & James R. Hines, Jr., Expectations and Expatriations: Tracing the Causes and
Consequences of Corporate Inversions, 55 Nat'l Tax J. 409, 421 (2002).
2 See Staff of Joint Comm. on Taxation, 107th Cong., Background and Present Law
Relating to Tax Shelters (Comm. Print 2002), available at http://www.house.gov/jct/x-
19-02.pdf (Mar. 21, 2002) (on file with the Virginia Law Review Association); Gerald
W. Miller, Jr., Corporate Tax Shelters and Economic Substance: An Analysis of the
Problem and its Common Law Solution, 34 Tex. Tech L. Rev. 1015, 1065-67 (2003);
Jeffrey H. Paravano & Melinda L. Reynolds, 798 Tax Mgmt. Tax Shelters (BNA
2003).
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and attempts by international actors like the Organization for Eco-
nomic Cooperation and Development ("OECD") and the Euro-
pean Union to restrict harmful tax competition. 2 Both of these ef-
forts, however, have been hampered by the lack of a convincing
normative justification for the corporate tax. In the absence of such
a justification, opponents of these efforts can portray them as a
pure revenue grab, and supporters find it difficult to explain what
is so bad about letting the corporate tax wither away as a result of
taxpayer self-help.23
In this Part, I survey the existing, and unconvincing, attempts to
defend the existence of the corporate tax.24 These defenses can
generally be divided into three types, which correspond to the
three theories of the corporation adumbrated above: aggregate,
real entity, and artificial entity. 5 The first and most common type
22 See, e.g., Avi-Yonah, Globalization, supra note 13, at 1652-1666; Yoram Mar-
galioth, Tax Competition, Foreign Direct Investment and Growth: Using the Tax Sys-
tem to Promote Developing Countries, 23 Va. Tax Rev. 161, 197-98 (2003); Roin, su-
pra note 18, at 547-48.
23 See, e.g., David J. Shakow, Wither, "C"!, 45 Tax L. Rev. 177, 182-83 (1990) (sug-
gesting in response to Bernard Wolfman, Whither "C"?, 38 Tax Notes 1269 (1988),
that it would be better if the corporate tax were eliminated).
24 A simple justification of the corporate tax might be: The state has certain legiti-
mate revenue requirements, part of which it must fulfill by taxation. Corporations
have significant financial resources. Thus, the state is justified in taxing corporations
to meet its revenue needs.
This argument is similar to Willie Sutton's immortal response to the question why
he robbed banks ("that's where the money is"). The argument is clearly inadequate,
however, because the state can fulfill its revenue needs in other ways such as by tax-
ing individuals more-the revenue raised by the corporate tax in developed coun-
tries is a sufficiently low percentage of Gross Domestic Product ("GDP") that it can
easily be made up by raising individual taxes. This is particularly true for the United
States; a very low Value Added Tax ("VAT") rate would more than make up for the
corporate tax, and if the revenues are used for redistributive purposes, they might be
more regressive. The corporate tax would be more difficult to replace in Europe
(with existing high individual income tax and VAT rates), and even more so in de-
veloping countries, where it can amount to 25% of total tax revenues. See Asegedech
WoldeMariam, Summary Tax Structure Tables, 1975-92, in Tax Policy Handbook
287, 294 tbl.6, 300 tbl.12, 303 tbl.18, 306 tbl.24, 312 tbl.30 (Parthasarathi Shome ed.,
1995). Therefore, a more elaborate justification of the corporate tax is required.
25 For a fuller exposition of these three theories, see infra Part III. These theories
are the standard ones described in the literature. See, e.g., William W. Bratton, Jr.,
The New Economic Theory of the Firm: Critical Perspectives from History, 41 Stan.
L. Rev. 1471, 1475-76 (1989); Henry N. Butler, The Contractual Theory of The Cor-
poration, 11 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 99, 99-101 (1989); Mark M. Hager, Bodies Politic:
The Progressive History of Organizational "Real Entity" Theory, 50 U. Pitt. L. Rev.
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of defense views the corporate tax as an administratively conven-
ient device to collect tax on shareholders. This view reflects the
currently dominant aggregate (contractarian, nexus of contracts)
theory of the corporation as an amalgam of its shareholders. The
second type of defense views the corporate tax as payment for
some kind of benefit conferred by the state. This defense reflects
the artificial theory of the corporation as owing its existence to the
state. Finally, the third type of defense relates the corporate tax to
the relationship between shareholders and management and views
the corporate tax as a mechanism to regulate this relationship. This
defense is closest to the real view of the corporation as separate
from both the shareholders and the state.
A. Aggregate Defenses of the Corporate Tax
The most common current defense of the corporate tax is based
on the aggregate theory of the corporation in that it views the cor-
porate tax as an indirect way of taxing the shareholders.26 The ar-
gument goes as follows: If there were no corporate tax imposed,
given that corporations are treated as separate legal entities from
shareholders, individuals could shelter their income from tax by
earning it through corporations.27 This would result at least in de-
ferral of the tax until a dividend is paid or the shareholder sells the
shares, and might result in total income tax exemption if the share-
holder holds the shares until her death and a step-up in basis is
available. 8 In addition, it is argued, collecting the tax from corpora-
tions rather than directly from shareholders has administrative ad-
vantages because there are fewer corporations than shareholders
575, 578-82 (1989); David Millon, Theories of the Corporation, 1990 Duke L.J. 201,
201-05 (1990). Ultimately, they stem from the work of three great nineteenth-century
German jurists: Savigny (artificial entity), Ihering (aggregate), and Gierke (real en-
tity). See Sanford A. Schane, The Corporation is a Person: The Language of a Legal
Fiction, 61 Tul. L. Rev. 563, 565-67 (1987).
" Charles E. McLure Jr., Must Corporate Income Be Taxed Twice? 20 (1979).27See, e.g., Roger H. Gordon & Jeffrey K. MacKie-Mason, Why Is There Corpo-
rate Taxation In a Small Open Economy? The Role of Transfer Pricing and In-
come Shifting, in The Effects of Taxation on Multinational Corporations 67, 69
(Martin Feldstein et al. eds., 1995); Richard M. Bird, Why Tax Corporations?
(Comm. on Bus. Taxation, Can. Dep't of Fin., Working Paper No. 96-2, Dec.
1996), at http://www.fin.gc.ca/taxstudy/wp96-2e.html (on file with the Virginia Law
Review Association).
2 See I.R.C. § 1014 (a)(1) (2000).
2004] 1201
HeinOnline  -- 90 Va. L. Rev. 1201 2004
Virginia Law Review
and because shareholders may be hard to reach (for example, be-
cause they are foreign or tax exempt).
2 9
From this perspective, the corporate tax can be viewed as a
withholding tax imposed on the shareholders at the corporate
source of their income. In fact, that was the view of the tax when it
was first imposed in 1894.30 It naturally follows that shareholders
should not be taxed again when dividends are distributed to them,
just like employees receive a credit for taxes withheld from their
paychecks by employers. There are a variety of ways to accomplish
this goal, which has been named "integration." Under a recent
proposal by the Bush administration, a form of which is followed
by many countries (and has been partially adopted by Congress),
dividends are exempt from tax when received by shareholders.3"
Alternatively, as in other countries, shareholders get a credit for
taxes paid by the corporation against their individual tax liability.32
A third alternative that is rarely adopted but is also consistent with
the aggregate view is to impose a corporate tax but permit corpora-
tions to deduct dividends from their corporate tax base, thus in ef-
fect eliminating the corporate tax to the extent profits are distrib-
uted to and taxed in the hands of shareholders.33
It is far from clear, however, that there are no practical ways of
taxing shareholders on corporate income without imposing a cor-
" Bird, supra note 27, at 9-12.
30 Steven A. Bank, Entity Theory as Myth in the Origins of the Corporate Income
Tax, 43 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 447,497-98 (2001).
31 See U.S. Treasury Dep't, supra note 7; Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, The Pitfalls of In-
ternational Integration: A Comment on the Bush Proposal and its Aftermath, Int'l
Tax & Pub. Fin. (forthcoming 2004) (manuscript at 1, on file with the Virginia Law
Review Association) [hereinafter Avi-Yonah, Pitfalls]. See Section IV.C for a fuller
discussion of integration.
32 See, e.g., Michael J. Graetz & Alvin C. Warren, Jr., Integration of Corporate and
Individual Income Taxes: An Introduction, 84 Tax Notes 1767, 1769 (1999); Richard
J. Vann, General Report: Trends in Company/Shareholder Taxation: Single or Dou-
ble Taxation?, in International Fiscal Association 2003 Sydney Conference 21, 30-32
(2003); Alvin Warren, The Relation and Integration of Individual and Corporate In-
come Taxes, 94 Harv. L. Rev. 717, 773-74 (1981). The main difference between the
two methods is that with dividend exemption, the corporate tax is final and thus no
taxpayer pays tax at a rate higher than the corporate rate, while shareholder credits
permit more progressivity. As Vann notes, the trend is toward the exemption method.
See Vann, supra, at 68.
" See Graetz & Warren, supra note 32, at 1769. This alternative is rarely adopted
because it does not easily permit collection of tax from foreign and tax-exempt share-
holders.
1202 [Vol. 90:1193
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porate level tax.14 Corporations can, for this purpose, be divided
into two categories-closely held and publicly traded. For closely
held corporations, the obvious solution is to tax shareholders di-
rectly on corporate income as it is earned, since it can easily be at-
tributed to them (whether or not it is distributed). This is, in fact,
the way most closely held corporations are currently taxed in the
United States-they are either so-called "S corporations" or Lim-
ited Liability Companies ("LLCs") that are treated as partnerships
or sole proprietorships for tax purposes. In both cases, no corpo-
rate-level tax is imposed, and shareholders are taxed directly on
corporate profits as they are earned. It seems a simple matter to
extend this treatment, which is currently elective, to all closely held
corporations.35
Most of the corporate tax, however, is collected from publicly
traded corporations, and for those it is generally assumed that pass-
through taxation is not administratively feasible. Precisely be-
cause they are publicly traded, however, a ready alternative pre-
sents itself to address the deferral problem-taxing shareholders
on a mark-to-market basis on the appreciation and depreciation of
their shares. The usual objections to mark-to-market taxation are
14 In addition, it is not clear that the corporate tax in fact falls on shareholders as an
economic matter-in some circumstances it may be shifted to consumers or labor.
Most economists assume, however, that the tax falls at least in part on shareholders in
the short run, and on all capital providers in the long run. See, e.g., Martin Feldstein,
Incidence of a Capital Income Tax in a Growing Economy with Variable Savings
Rates, 41 Rev. Econ. Stud. 505, 510-11 (1974); Graetz & Warren, supra note 32, at
1774; Ronald E. Grieson, The Incidence of Profits Taxes in a Neo-Classical Growth
Model, 4 J. Pub. Econ. 75, 82-84 (1975); Masaaki Homma, A Dynamic Analysis of the
Differential Incidence of Capital and Labour Taxes in a Two-Class Economy, 15 J.
Pub. Econ. 363, 374-77 (1981); Kenneth L. Judd, Redistributive Taxation in a Simple
Perfect Foresight Model, 28 J. Pub. Econ. 59, 59-60 (1985); Don Fullerton & Gilbert
E. Metcalf, Tax Incidence 20-23 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper
No. w8829, 2002), at http://www.nber.org/papers/w8829.pdf (on file with the Virginia
Law Review Association); Casey B. Mulligan, Capital Tax Incidence: First Impres-
sions from the Time Series 18-19 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper
No. w9374, 2002), at http://www.nber.org/papers/w9374.pdf (on file with the Virginia
Law Review Association). All of these studies refine the classic work of Arnold Har-
berger. See Arnold Harberger, The Incidence of the Corporation Income Tax, 70 J.
Pol. Econ. 215 (1962).
" See George K. Yin, The Future Taxation of Private Business Firms, 4 Fla. Tax
Rev. 141, 151-53 (1999) (stating the basic case for taxing shareholders).
36 But see Polito, supra note 8, at 1032-34 (suggesting various methods to make
integration administratively feasible).
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based on liquidity and valuation concerns, and neither of these is
an issue for publicly traded shares. They are liquid by definition,
and their value can be ascertained on a daily basis by opening the
financial pages of any newspaper.
Mark-to-market, or accrual taxation, is the normative ideal of a
Haig-Simons income tax, and many commentators support moving
in that direction to the extent it is administratively feasible to do
so. 37 Professor Dodge has exhaustively explored and demonstrated
the feasibility of mark-to-market taxation for shareholders in pub-
licly traded corporations.38 Moreover, this type of taxation also ex-
ists in practice-U.S. shareholders in certain foreign corporations
earning mostly passive income (Passive Foreign Investment Com-
panies, or PFICs) are given the choice between either paying tax
on the corporation's income directly (if the corporation agrees to
furnish the necessary information, which usually applies only when
it is closely held), paying tax on the shares on a mark-to-market ba-
sis, or paying an interest charge when they receive a dividend or
dispose of the shares.39 A similar system could be applied to all
publicly traded corporations.
Mark-to-market taxation is complex, and imposing tax on unre-
alized gains is likely to run into significant political opposition. The
costs of these administrative complexities are not, however, likely
to be larger than the costs imposed by the existing corporate tax,
and the political opposition needs to be offset against the political
support of corporate management for repealing the corporate tax. 4
The adoption of the PFIC rules in 1986 shows that this solution is
not politically unimaginable.
Finally, other administrative advantages of maintaining a corpo-
rate tax should be addressed. It is indeed easier to collect tax from
a few corporations than from many shareholders, but even if one
assumes that one tax in fact substitutes for the other, this advan-
37 Halperin, supra note 8, at 817; David J. Shakow, Taxation Without Realization: A
Proposal for Accrual Taxation, 134 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1111, 1113-18 (1986). Note that to
the extent the corporate tax is needed to increase progressivity in the overall tax sys-
tem, taxing shareholders directly is a more accurate way of doing so, as some share-
holders in lower brackets are overtaxed by the current corporate tax.
38 See Dodge, supra note 8, at 294-97.
39I.R.C. §§ 1291-97 (2000).
4'A separate issue is political opposition to corporate tax repeal, which is discussed
elsewhere. See infra notes 70-76 and accompanying text.
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tage needs to be offset against the many costs of having the tax."
The most convincing argument from this perspective is that a cor-
porate tax is necessary when shareholders are hard to reach be-
cause they are tax exempt or foreign. A large percentage of corpo-
rate equity is in fact held by tax-exempt shareholders, but it is not
clear as a normative matter why these shareholders should be
taxed on income they earn through corporations, but not on other
income.42 As for foreigners, it may be possible to tax at least large
foreign shareholders on both dividends and capital gains through
withholding. 3 In addition, maintaining the entire corporate tax just
in order to reach foreign shareholders in a country like the United
States, in which the large majority of shareholders are domestic,
seems like letting the tail wag the dog."
Thus, the most common rationale for retaining the corporate
tax-that it is necessary from a deferral and administrability per-
spective as an indirect way of taxing shareholders-seems to rest
on shaky ground. Both the deferral and the administrability issues
can be resolved by other means, such as pass-through taxation of
closely held corporations and mark-to-market taxation of share-
holders in publicly traded corporations.
B. Artificial Entity Defenses of the Corporate Tax
A second type of defense links the corporate tax to benefits pro-
vided by the state and treats it as a type of benefit tax. The tax is
4' Bird, supra note 27, at 10-11.
,2The issue of "unfair competition" with taxable businesses can be addressed by
imposing an unrelated business income tax ("U.B.I.T.") at the shareholder level. See
I.R.C. §§ 511-515 (2000).
43The United States does in fact tax most dividends, and many countries tax capital
gains of large foreign shareholders. See Hugh J. Ault et al., Comparative Income
Taxation: A Structural Analysis 411 (1997).
'"This is a stronger justification for developing countries in which the entire corpo-
rate sector is foreign owned and the corporate tax on such enterprises is a significant
percentage of all revenues. For a defense of the corporate tax in that context, see Avi-
Yonah, Globalization, supra note 13, at 1640-41; Bird, supra note 27, at 6-8.
41 See Richard A. Musgrave & Peggy B. Musgrave, Public Finance in Theory and
Practice 373-74 (5th ed. 1989); Bird, supra note 27, at 4-5. This was also part of the
argument in favor of enactment in 1909, in which the tax was described as an excise
tax on the privilege of doing business in corporate form, but this was done to avoid
treating the tax as a direct tax that would be unconstitutional under the Supreme
2004] 1205
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conceived as a payment in return for the benefits of incorporation,
such as limited liability. This defense is linked to the artificial entity
view of the corporation, which views it purely as a creature of the
state.
There are several objections to this defense. First, some of the
benefits conferred by government also flow to non-incorporated
businesses not subject to the tax. Second, the specific benefits of
incorporation are provided by state government, not by the federal
government. Finally, there is no correlation between corporate in-
come and the benefits provided, since the same benefits apply (and
in the case of limited liability, apply more forcefully) to corpora-
tions that lose money.
4 6
A more sophisticated variant of the benefits theory is advanced
by Professor Rebecca Rudnick, who argues that the corporate tax
can be justified as a payment for the greater liquidity afforded by
access to the public equity market." Under the current regime,
there is a correlation between access to public equity markets and
the corporate tax, which makes this analysis appealing." It is un-
clear, however, whether there is any correlation between corporate
income and liquidity; most publicly traded entities benefit from the
same degree of liquidity but vary greatly in profitability. Rudnick
argues that liquidity facilitates the creation of economic rents, and
she would therefore revamp the tax to focus on these.49 Similarly,
Professors Joseph Bankman and Michael Knoll have proposed bas-
ing the corporate tax on changes in the value of outstanding corpo-
rate equity." Such changes in the tax base would perhaps create a
better link to liquidity, but they are not a defense of the corporate
income tax we currently have in place. Similarly, Professor Herwig
Court's 1895 decision, Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429 (1895),
aff'd on reh'g, 158 U.S. 601 (1895). See also infra Section l.B."6Musgrave & Musgrave, supra note 45, at 373-74; Bird, supra note 27, at 5. The
Musgraves also argues that some benefits, such as limited liability, are costless to soci-
ety and therefore cannot justify a tax, Musgrave & Musgrave, supra note 45, at 373-74
(although I am not sure they are right about limited liability having no costs).
, Rebecca S. Rudnick, Who Should Pay the Corporate Tax in a Flat Tax World?, 39
Case W. Res. L. Rev. 965, 985-86 (1989).
' William A. Klein & Eric M. Zolt, Business Form, Limited Liability, and Tax Re-
gimes: Lurching Toward a Coherent Outcome?, 66 U. Colo. L. Rev. 1001, 1015-17
(1995).
4' Rudnick, supra note 47, at 985-86.0Bankman, supra note 9, at 1347; Knoll, supra note 9, at 1.
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Schlunk has proposed to substitute for the corporate tax an "entity
income tax" to be levied on all large entities (incorporated vel non)
for the benefit of operating as a Coasian "firm."5' This likewise is
not a defense of the current corporate tax; in fact, Schlunk argues
that no "colorable" defense of the current tax exists.52
Finally, the strongest benefits argument for the corporate tax is
for a tax on foreign corporations doing business in a source juris-
diction.53 In that regard, it has long been accepted that source juris-
dictions may collect a tax from corporations doing business (above
a certain minimal threshold) within their borders, because the host
government created the market conditions that enable the income
to be earned.' There probably is some correlation between, for ex-
ample, the quality of infrastructure or education in the host coun-
try and the degree of profitability of foreign direct investment in
it. " As argued above, however, it seems strange in the U.S. context
to maintain the entire corporate tax just to collect a benefits pay-
ment from foreign corporations, since most of the corporations
subject to the tax are domestic corporations. 6 Additionally, if one
argues that the same infrastructure benefits justifying the corporate
tax on foreign corporations also apply to domestic corporations,
the argument would hold equally true for non-incorporated or
closely held businesses that are not subject to the corporate tax.
In sum, the artificial entity or benefits argument for the corpo-
rate tax is unconvincing because there is no correlation between
the existing corporate tax and the kind of benefits (if any) that the
"1 Schlunk, supra note 10, at 382. It is not clear why this is a benefit provided by the
federal government. In fact, the inability to decide which government (if any) pro-
vides this particular benefit lies at the heart of the difficulty of allocating the income
of multinational enterprises among tax jurisdictions. For a discussion of this problem
in the context of transfer pricing, see Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, The Rise and Fall of
Arm's Length: A Study in the Evolution of U.S. International Taxation, 15 Va. Tax
Rev. 89 (1995).
52 Schlunk, supra note 10, at 332.
"' Of course, it is also easier politically to tax foreigners than to tax domestic corpo-
rations, which is precisely the reason tax treaties make it hard to discriminate against
foreign corporations.
SMichael J. Graetz & Michael M. O'Hear, The "Original Intent" of U.S. Interna-
tional Taxation, 46 Duke L.J. 1021, 1036-37 (1997).
"' See Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, International Taxation of Electronic Commerce, 52
Tax L. Rev. 507, 521 (1997).
56 See supra text accompanying note 44.
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federal government provides only to those entities that are subject
to the tax, namely publicly traded corporations.
C. Real Entity Defenses of the Corporate Tax
The view of the corporation as a real entity, separate from both
its shareholders and from the state, has not had much resonance in
the tax area. After all, as Professors Richard and Peggy Musgrave
point out in their classic public finance textbook, a view of the cor-
poration as a distinct entity with economic resources under its con-
trol is "hardly tenable" in the tax context because the economic
burden of taxes must ultimately fall on natural persons.57 There is
no reason that the income of those natural persons should be sub-
ject to a second level of tax simply because it is earned through a
corporation.
Nevertheless, there is one way in which the corporation clearly
exists as a separate entity from its shareholders and the state-as
an organization under the control of corporate management. Man-
agement make the decisions whether to deploy the corporation's
economic resources, and in that sense management can be re-
garded as the real corporation. This is particularly true for the pub-
licly traded corporation in which ownership is (to paraphrase Pro-
fessors Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means) separated from control.8
In recent years, a few academics have focused on the existence
of corporate management and the agency-cost problem it creates
as a separate justification for the corporate tax.59 This line of argu-
ment is appealing because it applies only to publicly traded corpo-
rations that bear the brunt of the existing corporate tax.
Thus, Professors Saul Levmore and Hideki Kanda argue that the
corporate tax is necessary because otherwise the agency-cost prob-
lem will be exacerbated when management (which may or may not
include shareholders) face a different tax rate for corporate actions
than some shareholders.' For example, if management are share-
holders and there is no corporate tax, they may face a tax rate of
"7 Musgrave & Musgrave, supra note 45, at 372-73.
' Adolf A. Berle & Gardiner C. Means, The Modern Corporation and Private
Property 68 (1932).
" See Hideki Kanda & Saul Levmore, Taxes, Agency Costs, and the Price of Incor-
poration, 77 Va. L. Rev. 211,213 (1991).
'o Id. at 229-31.
HeinOnline  -- 90 Va. L. Rev. 1208 2004
Corporations, Society, and the State
35% upon selling a corporate asset while other shareholders are
taxed at zero. Management may thus be deterred by their individ-
ual tax burden from taking actions that are in the best interests of
all shareholders. With a corporate tax in place, all corporate ac-
tions face the same tax rate.6'
This argument is unpersuasive for several reasons. First, if we as-
sume that the corporate tax is borne by shareholders, the same ar-
gument would apply even with a corporate tax-management who
are taxable shareholders would ultimately face the double tax on
dispositions while tax-exempt shareholders face only a single tax.62
If the corporate tax is not borne by shareholders, then its existence
vel non should have no impact on management actions. Second, if
the Levmore and Kanda analysis is correct, it would apply to any
positive corporate tax rate as long as it is imposed on all corporate-
level activity, so it would at best justify a minimal tax. Finally, it
seems far-fetched to hang the entire corporate tax on this type of
consideration. Agency-cost problems are pervasive in any public
corporation and it seems easier to address them by corporate law
means rather than through the tax code.63
More recently, Professor Mihir Desai and his colleagues have
argued that imposing a corporate tax can be a way of preventing
management from diverting corporate resources to their own
pockets.' 4 Specifically, if corporate income must be declared for tax
purposes, it becomes harder to conceal its theft from the corpora-
tion's shareholders. This is an ingenious argument, which (as we
61 See id. at 233. For a similar argument based on agency costs that focuses more on
the integration issue, see Joseph A. Snoe, The Entity Tax and Corporate Integration:
An Agency Cost Analysis and a Call for a Deferred Distributions Tax, 48 U. Miami
L. Rev. 1, 43-44 (1993).
62 If dividends are exempt (as under President Bush's proposal), then all sharehold-
ers face the same zero rate at the shareholder level regardless of any corporate tax.
63It also seems implausible if shareholders are taxed on a mark-to-market basis and
the corporate tax is repealed that management would forego corporate actions that
increase the value of the shares they hold just because they have to pay tax on that
increase, since their job performance and the value of their stock options depend on
share value. Professors Levmore and Kanda seem to assume a pass-through model of
taxation in the absence of the corporate tax, which is implausible for publicly traded
corporations for administrability reasons.
' Mihir Desai et al., The Protecting Hand: Taxation and Corporate Governance 4
(Mar. 2003) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Virginia Law Review Associa-
tion).
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shall see) also reflects some of the original intent in enacting the
corporate tax in 1909.65 From today's perspective, however, it
seems like a shaky foundation for the entire corporate tax.66 Man-
agement theft can be combated by other means, and a requirement
to report income without tax (or with only a minimal tax) would do
just as well to achieve the goal promoted by Professor Desai.
Thus, there is currently no convincing defense of the corporate
tax based on the real entity view either. Nevertheless, as explained
below, this view of the corporation provides the best argument in
favor of the tax.67
D. Summary
It seems that there is no convincing defense of the corporate tax
in the academic literature. The mainstream view of the corporate
tax as an indirect way of taxing shareholders, which is based on the
aggregate theory, is flawed because it is quite possible to tax share-
holders directly without a corporate-level tax. Alternative defenses
of the corporate tax that are based on the artificial view and real
entity view are likewise unpersuasive. This leads some commenta-
tors to the conclusion that the corporate tax, with all its efficiency
and complexity costs, should simply be repealed.6" Other commen-
tators favor letting the tax gradually disappear as a result of tax-
payer actions."
Yet it does not seem likely that the corporate tax will be re-
pealed any time soon. Current proposals focus more on repealing
the tax on dividends while retaining the corporate-level tax, and
even more radical reform efforts like the flat tax proposal would
65 See discussion infra Section II.B.
It may, however, have some application in countries like Russia, from which Desai
and his colleagues draw most of their examples. Desai, supra note 64, at 16-25. In the
case of his U.S. example (Tyco), it should be noted that Tyco managers were ulti-
mately caught by the criminal justice system, and that their behavior (stealing hun-
dreds of millions of dollars from the corporation) seems a rather extreme basis for a
corporate tax defense. See id. at 4-9.
67 See infra Part III.
See, e.g., Dodge, supra note 8, at 268-78 (proposing a mark-to-market and pass-
through shareholder integration system).69 Interview with Austan Goolsbee, Professor of Business Administration, Univer-
sity of Chicago, at Office of Tax Policy Research Conference on Worldwide Tax
Competition, in Ann Arbor, Mich. (Oct. 2000).
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maintain a corporate level tax on above-normal returns." When
former Secretary of the Treasury Paul O'Neill announced that he
favored repealing the corporate tax on the basis of his experience
as a CEO, the proposal did not have any political traction. In the
current political climate, demise of the corporate tax due to tax-
payer self-help seems much more likely than actual repeal.
Why is the corporate tax so politically resilient? The reason
seems to be the same as the reason the corporate alternative mini-
mum tax ("AMT") was enacted in 1986-ordinary Americans have
a viscerally negative reaction to the notion that large, profitable
corporations should pay no tax while they bear the income tax
burden. 2 This is universally dismissed as an example of ordinary
people's fiscal illusion, the misguided belief that corporations bear
the burden of the tax, while every economically literate person
knows that taxes can be borne only by natural persons."
But are people really that ignorant? I would argue that the an-
swer is no, and that in fact what people perceive is closer to reality
than the economic models of incidence would suggest. The corpo-
rate tax is imposed on corporate income, which adds to the eco-
nomic resources of the corporation. These resources are managed
by individual corporate managers, and their control over such re-
sources gives them significant economic, social, and political
power. In that sense, imposing a corporate tax that reduces the
economic resources available to corporate managers also reduces
the power of corporate management. Whatever the economic inci-
7The flat tax and other consumption tax proposals effectively exempt the normal
return to corporate equity by permitting corporations to currently deduct all capital
expenditures, while retaining the corporate tax for infra-marginal (above normal) re-
turns. See, e.g., Alvin Warren, How Much Capital Income Taxed Under an Income
Tax is Exempt under a Cash Flow Tax, 52 Tax L. Rev. 1 (1996).
71 Hughes, supra note 6.
The corporate AMT was enacted in response to newspaper reports about General
Electric and other large corporations paying no tax. See Terrence R. Chorvat & Mi-
chael S. Knoll, The Case for Repealing the Corporate Alternative Minimum Tax, 56
SMU L. Rev. 305, 305 & n.1 (2003).
" See Musgrave & Musgrave, supra note 45, 398-401; Bank, supra note 30, 449-52
(discussing historical understanding of the corporate tax); Bird, supra note 27, at 1-3;
Chorvat & Knoll, supra note 72, at 315; Michael L. Marlow, A Primer on the Corporate
Income Tax: Incidence, Efficiency, and Equity Issues 1 (Tax Foundation, Background
Paper No. 38, 2001), at http://www.taxfoundation.org/publications.background.html (on
file with the Virginia Law Review Association).
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dence of the corporate tax," from this perspective its most immedi-
ate burden falls on corporate management, and not surprisingly,
they are the strongest supporters of corporate tax repeal.75
This argument will be further developed in Part III. In the mean-
time, however, it is useful to link it to another question: Why was
the corporate tax enacted in the first place? What was the "original
intent" of its adopters, almost one hundred years ago? Examining
this question can help shed some light on the current debate. As we
will see, a major reason for its enactment was precisely to regulate
and place limits on the power of corporate management.76
II. A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE: WHY WAS THE CORPORATE TAX
ENACTED?
A. Antecedents: Aggregate-Based Taxation Before 1909
The first federal income tax, enacted to raise revenues during
the Civil War, did not tax corporations, although a withholding tax
was imposed on dividends and interest paid by railroad corpora-
tions and financial institutions, as well as on amounts added to sur-
plus.7 Instead, under the 1864 version of the tax, "the gains and
profits of all companies, whether incorporated or partnership,
other than the companies specified in this section, shall be included
in estimating the annual gains, profits, or income of any person en-
" The incidence issue is important because management might be less inclined to
protest if it could be shown that the tax is in fact shifted to employees or consumers,
leaving corporate profit accumulation unaffected. But as an empirical matter, it re-
mains unclear whether the tax can be shifted in most cases. See literature cited supra
note 34 and discussion infra Part III.
"Traditionally, they are much more lukewarm about dividend tax relief. In fact,
corporate management has largely been responsible for the current classical (double)
tax system, which they saw as a way to avoid higher corporate level taxes and pressure
to distribute dividends. See Jennifer Arlen & Deborah M. Weiss, A Political Theory
of Corporate Taxation, 105 Yale L.J. 325, 338, 341 (1995).
"The regulatory argument for the corporate tax is raised briefly but dismissed by
Musgrave & Musgrave, supra note 45, at 402-03, who argue that regulatory aims can
be more efficiently achieved by other means. For a discussion, see Part III.
17 Act of July 1, 1862, ch. 119, §§ 81-82, 12 Stat. 432, 469-70 (repealed 1874). Share-
holders and bondholders were permitted to exclude dividends and interest subject to
withholding from income. Id. § 91, 12 Stat. 473-74 (repealed 1874). On the early his-
tory of the corporate tax in the United States, see generally Bank, supra note 30.
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titled to the same, whether divided or otherwise."7 The Civil War
income tax thus included a form of pass-through taxation that ap-
plied to corporations, and the imposition of the tax on the undi-
vided profits of corporations was specifically upheld by the Su-
preme Court.79
Pass-through treatment of corporate profits reflected the aggre-
gate view of the corporation, which was prevalent at the time.' ° It
also reflected the fact that most corporations were small, closely
held enterprises, and therefore (like today) it was relatively easy to
identify the shareholders and to tax them on corporate profits. For
those enterprises that were more widely held, like railroads, a
withholding tax collected by the corporation effectively replaced
the tax on the shareholder. 1
The Civil War version of the income tax was allowed to expire
with the end of Reconstruction in 1872.2 In 1894, after the financial
panic of 1893 and the economic dislocation that followed, the De-
mocrats in Congress were able to pass an income tax bill. 3 The de-
bate at the time focused on the protective tariff, which was the
main source of revenue for the federal government.' The tariff
functioned as a highly regressive consumption tax and benefited
78 Act of June 30, 1864, ch. 173, § 117, 13 Stat. 223, 281-82 (repealed 1874). Also un-
der this act, a withholding tax was imposed on dividends and interest paid by certain
types of corporations, and such dividends and interest payments were excluded from
income. Id. at §§ 120-122, 13 Stat. at 283-85 (repealed 1874).
71 Collector v. Hubbard, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 1, 18 (1870).
o See Morton J. Horwitz, Santa Clara Revisited: The Development of Corporate
Theory, 88 W. Va. L. Rev. 173,183-86 (1985).
8I Note, however, that this was not a perfect replacement since the corporate rate
was 5% with no exemption whereas the top shareholder rate was 10% with a $600 ex-
emption. See Bank, supra note 30, at 457-58. The decision to treat the withholding tax
as the final tax in the case of widely held enterprises presumably reflected the practi-
cal difficulty of collecting tax on a pass-through basis in those cases. Id. at 522-24.
82 W. Elliot Brownlee, Historical Perspective on U.S. Tax Policy Toward the Rich, in
Does Atlas Shrug? The Economic Consequences of Taxing the Rich 29, 35 (Joel B.
Slemrod ed., 2000); Dennis J. Ventry, Jr., Equity Versus Efficiency and the U.S. Tax
System in Historical Perspective, in Tax Justice: The Ongoing Debate 25, 29 (Joseph
J. Thorndike & Dennis J. Ventry, Jr., eds., 2002); Steven R. Weisman, The Great Tax
Wars: Lincoln to Wilson-The Fierce Battles Over Money and Power That Trans-
formed the Nation 101 (2002).
83 Brownlee, supra note 82, at 37; Ventry, supra note 82, at 30; Weisman, supra note
82, at 131-46.
84 Brownlee, supra note 82, at 37; Ventry, supra note 82, at 29-30; Weisman, supra
note 82, at 138.
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the manufacturing centers of the Northeast at the expense of the
more agricultural South and West.85 The Democrats argued that re-
lying solely on tariffs allowed the newly super-rich railroad, steel,
and sugar magnates to escape any meaningful tax burden.' Their
argument was further bolstered by the fact that the state-level per-
sonal property taxes were notoriously ineffective in reaching intan-
gible forms of property, such as stocks and bonds.'
The 1894 Act for the first time imposed a tax of 2% on the net
income of all "corporations, companies, or associations doing busi-
ness for profit in the United States, no matter how created or or-
ganized, but not including partnerships."' At first impression this
appears to be a stark departure from the Civil War income tax,
which taxed corporate income in the hands of the shareholders and
only employed withholding at the corporate level as a collection
device. Professor Steven Bank, however, has convincingly demon-
strated that such a reading of the 1894 Act is misleading.89 First, he
points out that dividends from taxable corporations were excluded
from shareholder income so that the corporate tax could be viewed
as a collection device for the shareholder-level tax (imposed at the
same rate). 9 Second, the House version of the 1894 Act followed
the Civil War income tax in imposing a withholding tax on divi-
dends and interest, except that the tax was also applied to undis-
tributed income and to all corporations.9 I Thus, the progression
from the Civil War income tax to the House bill to the final version
of the 1894 Act can be seen as a gradual process of modifying what
was fundamentally a withholding tax imposed on the sharehold-
ers.92 Third, the Congressional debates on the 1894 Act show that
the principal motive for the corporate-level tax was to reach the
shareholders, most of whom were precisely the kind of rich indi-
85 Weisman, supra note 82, at 138.
86 Id. at 136-38.
87 Ventry, supra note 82, at 29-30.
8 Tariff Act of 1894, ch. 349, § 32, 28 Stat. 509, 556 (held unconstutitional in Pollock
v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429 (1895), aff'd on reh'g, 158 U.S. 601
(1895)).
89 Bank, supra note 30, at 504-37.
90Id. at 462 (citing Tariff Act of 1894, ch. 349, § 28, 28 Stat. 509, 554). Integration
was incomplete because corporations were not eligible for the $4000 exemption, see
id. at 462-63, but this can be explained by administrative convenience.
9'26 Cong. Rec. 6831 (1894).
Bank, supra note 30, at 517-19.
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viduals who were able to escape the state-level personal property
tax and whose corporations benefited from the high tariffs.93 Fi-
nally, Bank points out that the norm throughout the latter half of
the nineteenth century was for most corporations to distribute their
net earnings out as dividends. ' In that context, imposing a with-
holding tax on dividends was the most effective way to tax share-
holders in widely held enterprises, and imposing the same tax on
additions to surplus was merely another enforcement device to
prevent accumulated income from escaping tax. By 1894, the with-
holding tax was transformed to a tax on all the income of the cor-
poration (distributed or not), but was still seen primarily as a de-
vice to tax shareholders.95
Thus, throughout the nineteenth century, there was little evi-
dence at the federal level of direct taxation of corporations as such.
Withholding taxes were imposed at the corporate level on both dis-
tributed and undistributed income, but those were seen as an indi-
rect way of taxing shareholders consistent with the aggregate view
of the corporation.
B. The 1909 Act: A Real Entity Measure
In 1895, the Supreme Court struck down the 1894 Act as an un-
constitutional direct tax without apportionment.' The Democrats
immediately made reinstatement of the income tax a major plank
of their platform for the 1896 and 1900 elections, but to no avail.'
With the decisive victory of William McKinley (author of the noto-
rious McKinley tariff of 1890) and his corporate allies in 1896, the
income tax issue seemed dead."
The situation changed with the rise of the Progressives and the
accession of Theodore Roosevelt to the White House in 1901.
Roosevelt spent his seven years in office greatly expanding the
powers of the federal government vis-a-vis corporations. He was
the first President to attempt to use the Sherman Antitrust Act,
'3 Id. at 530.
9 Id. at 528-29.
Id. at 530-31.
16 Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429 (1895), aff'd on reh'g, 158
U.S. 601 (1895).
'7 Brownlee, supra note 82, at 37-38; Weisman, supra note 82, at 165-72.
9Weisman, supra note 82, at 175-77.
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adopted in 1890 but left largely unused until his time, to break up
the great monopolies, such as John D. Rockefeller's The Standard
Oil Company.99 In addition, he established the Bureau of Corpora-
tions to assemble information on, and ultimately perhaps to regu-
late, corporations." He also proposed that all corporations should
be incorporated under the authority of the federal government."'
On the tax front, Roosevelt expressed support in 1907 (after an-
other financial panic) for a graduated income tax, but supporters of
the tariff within the Republican Party were able to delay considera-
tion of the issue until after the 1908 election."° The newly elected
President Taft was less of a supporter of the income tax than his
predecessor and was worried about enacting another tax that
would be found to be unconstitutional. °3 He also faced increased
support for the income tax in Congress and a possible split within
his own party between Northeastern opponents of the tax and
Midwestern supporters." Eventually, President Taft proposed a
compromise: Enact a corporate excise tax measured by income,
which could withstand judicial scrutiny, and simultaneously submit
an amendment to the Constitution to permit enactment of an in-
come tax.'05
The legislative debate on the proposed tax was set in the broader
context of the debate on tariff reduction. Opponents of tariff re-
duction, mostly from the Northeast, viewed high tariffs as essential
to protecting American industry and argued that the benefits of
such tariffs extended to ordinary workers as well as to captains of
industry.'" Proponents of tariff reduction, mostly from the West
and the South, argued that high tariffs raised the price of goods
consumed by ordinary Americans to benefit the rich. 7
" See Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911); United States v.
N. Sec. Co., 193 U.S. 197 (1904).
'00 Act of Feb. 14, 1903, ch. 552, § 6, 32 Stat. 825, 827-28.
'0 Marjorie E. Kornhauser, Corporate Regulation and the Origins of the Corporate
Income Tax, 66 Ind. L.J. 53, 66 (1990). See discussion infra notes 165-68.
102 Weisman, supra note 82, 203-05.
'03 Id. at 211.
04 See id. at 226.
'05 Id. at 227.
06 Id. at 211.
07 See id. at 211-12.
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Initially, it seemed likely that the tariff bill (named after its co-
sponsors the Payne-Aldrich Tariff) would be passed by the Repub-
lican majority in both houses. In the House, income tax proponents
like Cordell Hull, a Democrat from Tennessee, were unable to at-
tach an income tax amendment to the tariff bill. In the Senate,
however, progressive Republicans like Robert La Follette, of Wis-
consin, and Democrats like Joseph Bailey, of Texas, were more ef-
fective in arguing for the income tax. La Follette and Bailey argued
that since the rich benefited more than the poor from government
protection, they should pay more for it, and that enacting the in-
come tax would silence the "envious voice of anarchy" (social-
ism) 
8
Ultimately, Senator Nelson Aldrich, Republican from Rhode Is-
land and the main opponent of the income tax, realized that with
nineteen Republicans threatening to join the Democrats and vote
for the income tax, he might lose.'" In a crucial meeting at the
White House, Aldrich and President Taft agreed to support instead
a corporate tax plus a constitutional amendment empowering Con-
gress to levy the income tax, while maintaining high tariffs."' Al-
drich stated, "I shall vote for a corporation tax as a means to defeat
the income tax.""' This compromise ultimately passed the Senate
45-34 and the House 195-183, and was signed into law by the
President on August 5, 1909.1'2
The 1909 Act imposed "a special excise tax with respect to the
carrying on or doing business" of 1% of net income over $5,000 of
"every corporation, joint stock company or association, organized
for profit" under U.S. law, and every foreign corporation engaged
in business in the United States." 3 Dividends from taxable corpora-
tions were excluded from corporate income.'"
4
What was the rationale for the 1909 Act, which is the origin of
our current corporate income tax? Proponents of the tax gave sev-




111 44 Cong. Rec. 3929 (1909) (statement of Sen. Aldrich).
"' Weisman, supra note 82, at 230-31.
.. Tariff Act of 1909, ch. 6, § 38, 36 Stat. 11, 112-13.
14 Id. § 38, 36 Stat. at 112.
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an indirect tax on shareholders view.1'5 As Professor Marjorie
Kornhauser has pointed out, however, a major motive for the act
was to regulate corporations. "6 The principal vehicle for regulation
was the filing of tax returns, which were to be made public."7 More
broadly, the tax itself fulfilled a potential regulatory function-it
could serve as a vehicle to restrict the accumulation of power in the
hands of corporate management."
The various motives for enacting the corporate tax, which reflect
the three theories of the corporation, can be seen in President
Taft's message to Congress and in the debate that preceded enact-
ment in the Senate. President Taft's message of June 16, 1909,
gives three reasons for enacting a corporate tax (rather than a gen-
eral income tax, which was thought to be possibly unconstitutional,
or an inheritance tax, which did not have sufficient political sup-
port among Republicans in the Senate).' 9 The first reason is that
"[t]his is an excise tax upon the privilege of doing business as an ar-
tificial entity and of freedom from a general partnership liability
enjoyed by those who own the stock.""'2 This argument is based on
an artificial entity view of the corporation as a creature of the state.
President Taft was aware, however, that it is difficult to make this
argument for a federal tax when the privileges enjoyed by the cor-
poration derived from state law.'2' The reason he made the argu-
ment, however, was that this formulation was necessary to ensure
the tax's constitutionality, since the Supreme Court had upheld
such an excise tax on sugar and oil companies in Spreckels Sugar
Refining Co. v. McClain.'22 President Taft added that nevertheless
the tax "accomplishes the same purpose as a corporation income
t a x .
,1 2 3
"' See discussion of Congressional debate, infra notes 130-52 and accompanying
text.
116 Kornhauser, supra note 101, at 53.
"' See discussion of publicity, infra notes 139-43 and accompanying text.
IS See discussion of regulatory function, infra notes 144-49.
119 See Weisman, supra note 82, at 227.
12044 Cong. Rec. 3344 (1909) (statement of President Taft).
121 See discussion of benefits argument in the Senate, infra note 133.
122 192 U.S. 397 (1904), cited in 44 Cong. Rec. 3344 (1909) (statement of President
Taft).
" 44 Cong. Rec. 3344 (1909) (statement of President Taft).
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The second argument President Taft made was that the corpo-
rate tax "imposes a burden at the source of the income at a time
when the corporation is well able to pay and when collection is
easy." '24 The reference to collection "at the source" relates to the
aggregate view of the corporation, since the tax is viewed as a
withholding tax imposed on the shareholders (referred to at the
time as "stoppage at source").'25 This is similar to the mainstream
modern view of the tax, although the reference to the corporations'
ability to pay (as opposed to the shareholders' ability to pay) has a
real entity overtone. President Taft probably did not emphasize the
nature of the tax as an indirect tax on shareholders because that
would have made it more suspect to the opponents of the income
tax as well as more vulnerable to a constitutional challenge.
Instead, the principal reason President Taft gave for enacting a
corporate tax was the third one-that it would enable the federal
government to exercise some degree of supervision, primarily by
obtaining information about the business affairs of corporations.
President Taft devoted a whole paragraph of his message to this
argument, much more than he gave to the first two. He stated the
following:
Another merit of this tax is the federal supervision which must
be exercised in order to make the law effective over the annual
accounts and business transactions of all corporations. While the
faculty of assuming a corporate form has been of the utmost util-
ity in the business world, it is also true that substantially all of the
abuses and all of the evils which have aroused the public to the
necessity of reform were made possible by the use of this very
faculty. If now, by a perfectly legitimate and effective system of
taxation, we are incidentally able to possess the Government and
the stockholders and the public of the knowledge of the real
business transactions and the gains and profits of every corpora-
tion in the country, we have made a long step toward that super-




125 Bank, supra note 30, at 517.
126 44 Cong. Rec. 3344 (1909) (statement of President Taft).
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This remarkable paragraph rests on the real entity view of the cor-
poration as separate from both the state and the shareholders. It
identifies corporate management as the source of "abuse of power"
and suggests that the imposition of the corporate tax will enable
the government, the shareholders, and the public to obtain infor-
mation that will serve as the basis for restricting such managerial
abuses of power. While the tax itself is incidental to the regulatory
mechanism, this statement is important because it delineates a rea-
son to tax corporations that is unrelated to the tax on shareholders
or to the benefits conferred by the state. The tax is imposed on
corporations because of the power exercised by corporate man-
agement, and management is clearly regarded as distinct from the
shareholders (who will in fact be beneficiaries of the supervision
over management actions). 27
The same mixture of motives can also be seen in the Congres-
sional debate over enactment. Proponents and opponents of the
tax reflected all three theories of the corporation. Some viewed it
primarily as a benefits tax,'28 others primarily as a tax on the share-
holders. 29 The predominant strain in the debate, however, was to
view the tax as a regulatory device to restrict abuses of managerial
power.
The artificial entity view of the tax was expressed primarily by
those proponents who sought to defend it from a constitutional at-
tack. 3 Senator Root, for example, who was one of the main draft-
ers of the bill, defended the tax in part as based on the privilege of
limited liability.' Opponents, however, were quick to point out
that since corporations were created under state law, the federal
government had no right to tax them under an artificial entity
127 Similarly, in a letter dated June 27, 1909, Taft identified the publicity feature as a
particularly important element of the tax, stating that "publicity gives a kind of fed-
eral supervision over corporations, which is quite a step in the direction of similar re-
forms I am going to recommend at the next session of Congress." Letter from William
Howard Taft to Horace Taft (June 27, 1909), in Papers of William Howard Taft 8, 8
(Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Reel 497), cited in Kornhauser, supra note
101, at 99.
' See infra note 133 and accompanying text.
129 See infra notes 134-37 and accompanying text.
'2See, e.g., 44 Cong. Rec. 4237 (1909) (statement of Sen. Daniel) (describing a cor-
poration as an artificial entity and defending the constitutionality of a tax on it).
13'44 Cong. Rec. 4006 (1909) (statement of Sen. Root).
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view.'3 2 In addition, opponents pointed out that unincorporated
businesses obtained from the federal government the same benefits
as corporations. '
The aggregate view was advanced by proponents who argued
that the corporate tax was an indirect way to tax wealthy share-
holders.'4 Opponents argued that the tax did not discriminate be-
tween wealthy and less wealthy shareholders.'35 Proponent Senator
Cummins stated that "[s]o far as taxes are concerned, corporations
are mere trustees for their shareholders; and their shareholders
must pay the tax."'36 Others argued that the tax would be shifted to
consumers or wage earners, at least by the strongest corporations
in the best position to avoid competition-the trusts. 137
By far the most significant debate centered on the real entity
view of the corporation and the argument that the tax was a regula-
tory device. Some of this debate centered on the publicity feature
of the tax, but some of it understood the tax as a preliminary
measure to control and limit managerial power directly. For exam-
ple, Senator Flint (a supporter of the tax) stated that "it would give
a certain amount of control of corporations by the National Gov-
13' "The United States did not create these corporations.... I should like to know
whether there is on the part of any Member of the Senate a belief that the Con-
gress... can, through the medium of taxation, destroy the corporations that have
been created by the several states?" 44 Cong. Rec. 3977 (1909) (statement of Sen.
Cummins).
133 "1 deny the right of Congress to levy a tax upon the business of corporations as
such .... It is an arbitrary [classification]; it is an unfair one .... [I]t is a tax upon the
right to do business as a corporation as distinguished from the right to do business as
an individual or as a copartnership." 44 Cong. Rec. 3976 (1909) (statement of Sen.
Cummins).
"3 See infra note 136.
' "Shall we levy an income tax upon the stockholders of all corporations for pecu-
niary profit, without respect or regard to the extent of the income earned or enjoyed
by those stockholders... ?" 44 Cong. Rec. 3955 (1909) (statement of Sen. Cummins);
see also 44 Cong. Rec. 4008 (1909) (statement of Sen. Clapp) (similar).
13644 Cong. Rec. 3975 (1909) (statement of Sen Cummins); see also Report of the
Commissioners of Corporations on the System of Taxing Manufacturing, Mercantile,
Transportation, and Transmission Corporations in the States of Connecticut, Maine,
Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Rhode Island and Vermont 11 (May 17, 1909) ("Obvi-
ously a tax on the corporation is really a tax upon its stockholders, for otherwise than as
a matter of legal reasoning a corporation and its stockholders are one.").
... See 44 Cong. Rec. 3985-87 (1909) (statement of Sen. Borah). Senator Cummins
likewise considered that the tax may be shifted from shareholders, 44 Cong. Rec. 3975
(1909) (statement of Sen. Cummins), as did Senator Clapp, 44 Cong. Rec. 4008 (1909)
(statement of Sen. Clapp).
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ernment, publicity as to the condition of the affairs of corporations,
and supervision to a certain extent over those corporations."3 '
Publicity was part of the regulatory scheme, but not the only part.
The publicity feature was stressed by many. Senator Dixon, for
example, stated that he favored the tax primarily because of the
publicity feature, for he feared the tax itself would not reach
wealthy shareholders.139 Senator Newlands likewise supported the
tax as "securing, through publicity and otherwise, such supervisory
control by the National Government as can be constitutionally ex-
ercised over corporations.""' Even Senator Aldrich, the ultra-
conservative chair of the Finance Committee, supported the
publicity feature.' Senator Cummins, who opposed the tax,
nevertheless supported the publicity feature because the
"revolution in industry" resulting from the rise of large corpo-
rations "is simply a prelude to industrial commercial slavery unless
the Government intervenes with its strong arm, and it can not
intervene unless it has the information necessary to enable it to act
intelligently and wisely."'' 2
Other Senators, however, emphasized the potential of the tax
to directly limit managerial power. Senator Newlands stated that
"I favor also present legislative action imposing an excise tax in
such form as to reach the great accumulated wealth of the coun-
try, or its earnings, engaged in corporate enterprise."'' 3 He did not
mean by this indirect taxation of wealthy shareholders, because
he went on to state that "there was no reason why the great com-
binations monopolizing these industries [protected by the tariff]
should not pay some part of the national expenses as well as the
:-"*44 Cong. Rec. 3937 (1909) (statement of Sen. Flint).
" 44 Cong. Rec. 3941 (1909) (statement of Sen. Dixon); see also 44 Cong. Rec. 4001
(1909) (statement of Sen. Bourne) ("I personally concur with the President that the
corporation net-earnings tax, in view of the publicity feature incident to it, is of infi-
nitely greater importance and will be far more beneficial to this country than either
the inheritance or income tax.").
'40 44 Cong. Rec. 3756 (1909) (statement of Sen. Newlands); see also 44 Cong. Rec.
3759 (1909) (statement of Sen. Newlands) (arguing that the corporate income tax will
provide valuable regulatory information concerning corporations).
141 See 44 Cong. Rec. 3930 (1909) (statement of Sen. Aldrich); see also 44 Cong. Rec.
4006-07 (1909) (statement of Sen. Root) (supporting the publicity feature).
42 44 Cong. Rec. 3965 (1909) (statement of Sen. Cummins).
'344 Cong. Rec. 3756 (1909) (statement of Sen. Newlands).
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masses of the people who use and consume [their products].""
Senator Newlands thus viewed the tax as falling on the accumu-
lated wealth in the hands of the corporation itself, that is, upon
corporate management.4 Senator Owen likewise spoke of the
''enormous volume of corporate wealth": "The most important
need of the people of the United States of this generation requires
the abatement of the gigantic fortunes being piled up by successful
monopoly,... which have brought about a grossly inequitable dis-
tribution of the proceeds of human labor. 1 46 Like other Democ-
rats, he would have preferred an income or inheritance tax, but he
supported the corporate tax for its potential direct impact on cor-
porate-that is, managerial-wealth.
Senator Root, a principal draftsman of the tax and personal
friend of the President, likewise emphasized the potential of the
tax to reach the wealth accumulated in the hands of corporate
management because he favored taxing such wealth over earned
income:
Mr. President, it has so happened that in the development of
the business of the United States the natural laws of trade have
been making the distinction [between earned and unearned in-
come] for us, and they have put the greater part of the accumu-
lated wealth of the country into the hands of corporations, so
that when we tax them we are imposing the tax upon the
accumulated income and relieving the earnings of the men who
are gaining a subsistence for their old age and for their families
after them.
'4 44 Cong. Rec. 3761 (1909) (statement of Sen. Newlands); see also 44 Cong. Rec.
3762 (1909) (statement of Sen. Newlands) ("Justice demands that the various forms of
manufactured wealth, in whose favor the taxing power of the Nation is so freely exer-
cised, should make some substantial contribution to the national expenses.").
14'44 Cong. Rec. 4048-49, 4233 (1909) (statement of Sen. Newlands) (advocating a
tax concentrated on the management of the great trusts and exempting small corpora-
tions); 44 Cong. Rec. 4229-30 (1909) (statement of Sen. Dolliver) (similar).
'444 Cong. Rec. 3950 (1909) (statement of Sen. Owen).
14'44 Cong. Rec. 4003 (1909) (statement of Sen. Root); see also 44 Cong. Rec. 4006
(1909) (statement of Sen. Root) (distinguishing between earned income and "accumu-
lated capital" which should be taxed). Senator Cummins argued that the corporate tax
would not achieve this purpose since it would fall on all shareholders, rather than just
on management. 44 Cong. Rec. 4038 (1909) (statement of Sen. Cummins).
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Opponents of the tax also stressed the regulatory aspect, but sug-
gested that it had the potential of giving the federal government
too much power over corporations. For example, Senator Cum-
mins, stated that:
If this tax is intended not to create a revenue, but if it is intended
for the purpose of supervising and regulating corporations, that is
quite a different proposition. I should like to know before we get
through with this whether it is proposed through this tax to im-
pose supervisory regulations upon all the corporations of the
United States.... You know there is just a little intimation in the
message of the President that that is the end which is finally to be
reached.... I think that before the Government of the United
States enters upon the work of supervising and regulating all
those corporations.., we had better stop and think a while.'48
Senator Cummins, however, was not opposed to all federal regula-
tion through the corporate tax. Rather he was opposed just to a tax
that indiscriminately applied to all corporations, as opposed to the
proper targets-the great trusts:
If we can regulate our corporations simply through the medium
of taxation, we can destroy every trust in a fortnight. It would be
a great deal better for the Finance Committee to turn its atten-
tion to the imposition of such a tax upon corporations and the
persons who actually need regulation, who are exercising powers
that are injurious to the American people, destroying competi-
tion and invading our prosperity, than to attempt to levy a reve-
nue tax upon all the little shareholders of all the little corpora-
tions throughout the length and breadth of the United States.'49
Other opponents of the tax likewise supported regulating the large
trusts through taxation, referring to the excise tax imposed on the
gross income of the sugar and oil trusts in 1898."' They opposed the
proposed corporate tax, however, because it exempted dividends
'844 Cong. Rec. 3978 (1909) (statement of Sen. Cummins); see also 44 Cong. Rec.
4047 (1909) (statement of Sen. Hughes) (arguing that regulation should be done di-
rectly).
1444 Cong. Rec. 3978 (1909) (statement of Sen. Cummins). Senator Cummins ar-
gued that much higher rates would drive the trusts out of business. 44 Cong. Rec. 4232
(1909) (statement of Sen. Cummins).
150 Cf. 44 Cong. Rec. 4009 (1909) (statement of Sen. Clapp).
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received from other taxable corporations from the tax base,
thereby encouraging the formation of holding companies-
precisely those companies that formed the legal basis for the
trusts."' Proponents of the tax replied that it was better to attack
the trusts via a tax on all corporations than to refrain from attack-
ing them at all. 52
C. Summary
Between 1894 and 1909 a significant change occurred in regard
to the justification for the corporate tax. The 1-894 tax was con-
ceived as a continuation of the Civil War tax, that is, as a withhold-
ing tax on shareholders. The 1909 tax, on the other hand, while still
seen by some opponents as an indirect tax on shareholders, was
primarily viewed as a regulatory device to restrict managerial
power. This goal was achieved most directly through the publicity
feature of the tax, but both proponents and opponents also saw the
tax as having the potential to regulate management directly by re-
ducing corporate wealth and therefore restricting managerial
power.
This shift can easily be discerned by comparing two Supreme
Court opinions dealing with the corporate tax. In 1870 the Court
decided that the Civil War income tax may be applied to tax share-
holders upon the undivided profits of a corporation. "3 Fifty years
later the Court held that a shareholder may not be taxed on a stock
dividend distributed by a corporation since that would be tanta-
mount to taxing her on the undistributed income of the corpora-
tion, which is not her income under the Sixteenth Amendment.
15 4
The Court stated:
We have no doubt of the power or duty of a court to look
through the form of the corporation and determine the question
of the stockholder's right, in order to ascertain whether he has
...See 44 Cong. Rec. 4010 (1909) (statement of Sen. Clapp); 44 Cong. Rec. 4230
(1909) (statement of Sen. Dolliver). Senator Aldrich replied that this was necessary to
avoid double corporate taxation and that no for-profit corporation was exempt from
tax. 44 Cong. Rec. 4231 (1909) (statement of Sen. Aldrich).
152 See, e.g., 44 Cong. Rec. 4036 (1909) (statement of Sen. Davis).
153 Collector v. Hubbard, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 1, 18 (1870).
" Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189 (1920).
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received income taxable by Congress without apportionment.
But, looking through the form, we cannot disregard the essential
truth disclosed; ignore the substantial difference between corpo-
ration and stockholder; treat the entire organization as unreal;
look upon stockholders as partners, when they are not such; treat
them as having in equity a right to a partition of the corporate as-
sets, when they have none; and indulge the fiction that they have
received and realized a share of the profits of the company which
in truth they have neither received nor realized. We must treat
the corporation as a substantial entity separate from the stock-
holder, not only because such is the practical fact but because it
is only by recognizing such separateness that any dividend-even
one paid in money or property-can be regarded as income of
the stockholder. Did we regard corporation and stockholders as
altogether identical, there would be no income except as the cor-
poration acquired it; and while this would be taxable against the
corporation as income under appropriate provisions of law, the
individual stockholders could not be separately and additionally
taxed with respect to their several shares even when divided,
since if there were entire identity between them and the com-
pany they could not be regarded as receiving anything from it,
any more than if one's money were to be removed from one
pocket to another.
15
Thus, by 1920, the Court viewed the corporation as a real entity
separate and distinct from the shareholders "because such is the
practical fact.' 56 The same real entity view underlay most, although
15 Id. at 213-14. The Court then went on to state that Hubbard was overruled by
Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429 (1895), aff'd on reh'g, 158 U.S.
601 (1895), and was not reinstated by the Sixteenth Amendment. Macomber, 252 U.S.
at 218-19.
1
56Macomber, 252 U.S. at 214. The other argument advanced by the Court-that
cash dividends could not be taxed-interestingly ignores the fact that between 1913
(when the Sixteenth Amendment was adopted and the first individual income tax was
adopted) and 1936, cash dividends were to some extent exempt from tax to share-
holders. See Bank, supra note 30, at 533. But dividends were taxed to the extent the
individual rate exceeded the basic or normal rate and the corporate rate was set
higher than the normal rate from 1918, resulting in partial double taxation. See Steven
A. Bank, Corporate Managers, Agency Costs, and the Rise of Double Taxation, 44
Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 167, 181-82 (2002) (discussing the historical evolution of double
taxation).
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not all, of the arguments made when the corporate tax was adopted
in 1909.
What accounts for the change between 1894, when the corporate
tax was seen as a withholding device and the aggregate view was
dominant, and 1909, when the real entity view was the main reason
for adopting a corporate tax? The principal reason is a significant
change in the nature of the corporation that occurred in this pe-
riod. From 1890 to 1916 American capitalism transformed from a
system of owner/manager enterprises operating in largely unregu-
lated competitive markets to a system dominated by relatively few
large, mostly non-owner managed corporations in a regulated
competitive market.17 In particular, although there were large-scale
corporations before the Progressive Era, consolidation began only
in the early 1890s and accelerated to a wave of consolidation by
merger between 1898 and 1904. '58 The key legal change was New
Jersey's adoption in 1890 of a new corporate law that permitted
holding corporations.5 9 This enabled the consolidators to avoid the
cumbersome "trust" structures (in which shareholders contributed
their shares to a trust in exchange for certificates of beneficial
ownership) for the simpler holding company structure of parent
and operating subsidiaries. The result was a wave of corporate mi-
gration to New Jersey, followed in the 1910s by another migration
to Delaware when New Jersey balked at further pro-management
rule changes.
The reaction to the emergence of the "trust issue" from around
1896 onward was a chorus of calls for more regulation. For example,
in 1906, Representative Martin of South Dakota defined a trust as "a
combination of corporations," identified the resulting "evils" as
"overcapitalization... the tendency to monopoly, and.., the de-
157 See Martin J. Sklar, The Corporate Reconstruction of American Capitalism,
1890-1916 (1988). For background, see generally Alfred D. Chandler, Jr., The Visible
Hand: The Managerial Revolution in American Business (1977).
"' Sklar, supra note 157, at 45-46 & n.4 (noting that little further concentration took
place between 1904 and 1954).
159 See Act of Apr. 21, 1896, ch. 185, 1896 N.J. Laws 309-310 § (9)(104); Lincoln
Steffens, New Jersey: A Traitor State: Part II-How She Sold Out to the United
States, 25 McClure's Mag. 41 (1905).
"0 For the classic debate on whether this was a "race to the bottom" or a "race to
the top," see William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon
Delaware, 83 Yale L.J. 663 (1974); Ralph K. Winter, Jr., State Law, Shareholder Pro-
tection, and the Theory of the Corporation, 6 J. Legal Stud. 251 (1977).
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struction of individual enterprise and success," and called for reme-
dial legislation that would combine "publicity," "free competition,"
and "close Federal supervision or regulation."'6 ' One immediate re-
sult was the attempt by President Roosevelt to control the trusts by
using the Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890, which led to the Supreme
Court ultimately breaking up The Standard Oil Company, though
holding at the same time that only "unreasonable" restraints of
trade were illegal.'62
President Roosevelt was not opposed to the growth of big busi-
ness; unlike the Populists, he did not believe in turning the clock back
to a "golden age" of small producers. But he did favor federal regula-
tion. In his 1907 message to Congress President Roosevelt declared:
I am in no sense hostile to corporations. This is an age of combina-
tion, and any effort to prevent all combination will be not only
useless, but in the end vicious.... We should, moreover, recognize
in cordial and ample fashion the immense good effected by corpo-
rate agencies.... The corporation has come to stay.'63
But the following year, he also stated that:
I strongly advocate that instead of an unwise effort to prohibit all
combinations, there shall be substituted [for the Sherman Act] a
law which shall expressly permit combinations which are in the
interest of the public, but shall at the same time give to some
agency of the National Government full power of control and
supervision over them.""
Roosevelt's first concrete proposal was for federal incorpora-
tion.16 ' The Hepburn Bill, introduced in 1908, would have allowed
corporations to voluntarily register with a federal office.166 The bill
failed, however, because of Republican opposition to such an ex-
161 40 Cong. Rec. 1849-51 (1906) (statement of Rep. Martin).
162 Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911); see also United
States v. Am. Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106, 179 (1911) (establishing a "rule of reason"
standard for interpreting the Sherman Act).
6342 Cong. Rec. 68 (1907) (statement of President Roosevelt).
'64 43 Cong. Rec. 17 (1908) (statement of President Roosevelt).
"' 42 Cong. Rec. 70 (1907) (statement of President Roosevelt).
'66 H.R. 19745, 60th Cong. (1908), reprinted in An Act to Regulate Commerce, Etc.:
Hearings on House Bill 19745 Before Subcomm. No. 3 of the House Comm. on the
Judiciary, 60th Cong. 3-6 (1908).
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pansion of executive branch power. If the federal government reg-
istered corporations, it could also de-register them.'67 Ultimately,
these concerns led to the Clayton Antitrust Act of 1914 and the es-
tablishment of the Federal Trade Commission."
The same concerns regarding trusts are reflected in the debates
over the corporate tax, which was seen by both supporters and op-
ponents as a regulatory measure. 69 Kornhauser focused primarily
on the publicity feature of the tax, but this was not its only regula-
tory aspect-both supporters and opponents saw the tax also as
having the potential to restrict managerial power directly.'70 Thus
Senator Root, the principal drafter of the tax on the Senate side,
spoke about the accumulation of wealth in the hands of corpora-
tions as a principal reason for the tax.'7 ' Senator Newlands likewise
supported the tax because "there was no reason why the great
combinations monopolizing these industries should not pay some
part of the national expenses."'7 Similarly, Senator Owen stated
that "[t]he most important need of the people of the United States
of this generation requires the abatement of the gigantic fortunes
being piled up by successful monopoly."'73 And Senator Cummins,
an opponent of the tax, likewise spoke about "the new force enter-
ing American life and American business" which is "a prelude to
industrial commercial slavery unless the Government intervenes
with its strong arm."'74 Senator Cummins opposed the tax because
it applied to all corporations, rather than just to the great combina-
167 Kornhauser, supra note 101, at 67.
168 Id.
'69 Id. at 62-63.
170 For a discussion of publicity, see id. at 69-82.
1744 Cong. Rec. 4003 (1909) (statement of Sen. Root).
172 44 Cong. Rec. 3761 (1909) (statement of Sen. Newlands). Senator Newlands sup-
ported in particular taxing all industries benefiting from the tariff. 44 Cong. Rec. 3762
(1909) (statement of Sen. Newlands); 44 Cong. Rec. 4049 (1909) (statement of Sen.
Newlands) (proposing an exemption for small corporations so as to "confine our taxa-
tion to these great combinations of capital whose profits have been enormous, whose
ability to bear is greater than that of any other class of the community, and whose
abuses have awakened the attention of the country and demand legislative cure").
17 44 Cong. Rec. 3950 (1909) (statement of Sen. Owen). He stated that corporate
wealth of publicly traded corporations amounted to one-third of national wealth. Id.;
see also 44 Cong. Rec. 4000-01 (1909) (statement by Sen. Bourne) (supporting the tax
because the tendency of business to consolidate requires strengthening the govern-
ment's ability to regulate).
.74 44 Cong. Rec. 3965 (1909) (statement of Sen. Cummins).
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tions, which he thought should be taxed more heavily."5 Senator
Clapp was similarly concerned about the trusts but argued that the
proposed tax did not address the problem because of the exemp-
tion of dividends paid to holding corporations. 6 Senator Cum-
mins's solution was to tax the trusts more heavily:
[I]f a company is organized for the purpose of consolidating a
dozen other companies with a view to controlling the business in
which those companies are engaged for the purpose of being able
to direct through a single board the management of the entire
field of industry ... aside from the contravention of public policy
involved in such an organization the privilege enjoyed is of price-
less value, and instead of being taxed at 2 per cent on the net
earnings it ought to be taxed at 10 or 15 per cent on the net earn-
ings, that it ought to be taxed so heavily that such companies
would become not only unfashionable but unprofitable as well.'77
The principal reason for the difference between the 1894 tax, a tax
on shareholders, and the 1909 tax, a tax on management, was thus
the rise of the great trusts in the period between 1896 and 1904."7
By 1909, the trust problem was perceived as the most serious issue
facing the country. 7 9 Some Democrats would have liked to turn
back the clock and outlaw the trusts, but the majority preferred to
... 44 Cong. Rec. 3978 (1909) (statement of Sen. Cummins).17644 Cong. Rec. 4009-10 (1909) (statement of Sen. Clapp) ("[T]he plain invitation,
the plain effect of this provision is to encourage the organization of the very kind of
corporations, great, powerful, overshadowing, absorbing industries, absorbing indus-
trial life and industrial affairs, by holding out to them immunity from taxation."); see
also 44 Cong. Rec. 4230 (1909) (statement of Sen. Dolliver) (focusing on the trust
problem as well). Senator Davis, by contrast, thought the solution to "the corpora-
tions of the country invading every avenue of business and trade" was "that if we can
not tax all the corporations, we should tax just as many of them as we can." 44 Cong.
Rec. 4036 (1909) (statement of Sen. Davis). And Senator Aldrich pointed out that no
corporation was exempt from the tax. 44 Cong. Rec. 4231 (1909) (statement of Sen.
Aldrich).
177 44 Cong. Rec. 4232 (1909) (statement of Sen. Cummins). Senator Newlands made
similar arguments. 44 Cong. Rec. 4233 (1909) (statement of Sen. Newlands).
"'By 1900, John D. Rockefeller had created the The Standard Oil Company and
capitalized it at $122 million. The following year J.P. Morgan created U.S. Steel in a
$1.4 billion transaction. Between 1898 and 1901, the capitalization of mergers totaled
$5.4 billion and 2,274 firms were merged out of existence. Sklar, supra note 157, at 45-
46.
... See Horace L. Wilgus, Need of a National Incorporation Law, 2 Mich. L. Rev.
358 (1904) (discussing the nature and scope of the trust problem).
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follow President Roosevelt and regulate them.' A primary vehicle
for such regulation was the corporate tax, in part because of its
publicity feature, but in part because, as many claimed during the
Congressional debate, the power to tax is the "equivalent of the
power to destroy."' 8 To tax the powerful trusts was seen as the be-
ginning of a federal power to regulate and potentially destroy
them. That was the fundamental rationale for enacting the corpo-
rate income tax. Is it still a valid rationale today? Answering this
question requires a move from historical to normative analysis.
III. A NORMATIVE PERSPECTIVE: WHAT IS THE JUSTIFICATION FOR
THE CORPORATE TAX TODAY?
A. The Reality of Corporate Power
A page of history may be worth a volume of logic'" as far as
explanatory power is concerned, but Justice Holmes also conceded
that history per se has no normative power. 3 Are there any nor-
mative lessons that can be drawn from the above history to justify
the existence of the corporate tax today?
I would argue that the answer is yes, for the following reasons.
From the Roman origins of the corporate form to today's multina-
tional enterprises ("MNEs"), the corporation underwent several
crucial changes. First, the concept of the corporation as a legal per-
son separate from its owners or members had to be developed, and
this development was only completed with the work of the civil law
commentators in the fourteenth century. By the end of the Middle
Ages, the membership corporation, that is, a corporation with sev-
eral members who chose others to succeed them, had legal person-
ality-the capacity to own property, sue and be sued, and even
bear criminal responsibility-and unlimited life, was well estab-
'80 See Kornhauser, supra note 101, at 63-64 (discussing the political positions on the
trusts and the government's preference for regulation).
181 See, e.g., 44 Cong. Rec. 3977 (statement of Sen. Cummins, referring to McCulloch
v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316 (1819)).1 N.Y. Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345,349 (1921).
183 Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 Harv. L. Rev. 457, 459 (1897).
'8The remainder of Section III.A is based on a companion paper, Reuven S. Avi-
Yonah, Aggregate, Artificial, or Real? The Cyclical Transformations of the Corpo-
rate Form (Jan. 9, 2004) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Virginia Law Re-
view Association) [hereinafter Avi-Yonah, Cyclical Transformations].
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lished in both civil and common law jurisdictions. The next impor-
tant step was the shift from non-profit membership corporations to
for-profit business corporations, which took place in England and
the United States in the end of the eighteenth century and begin-
ning of the nineteenth century. The third transformation was the
shift from closely held corporations to corporations whose shares
are widely held and publicly traded, and with it the rise of limited
liability and freedom to incorporate, which took place by the end
of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth cen-
tury. Finally, the last major transformation was from corporations
doing business in one country to MNEs whose operations span the
globe, which began after World War II and continues today.
Each of these four major transformations was accompanied by
changes in the legal conception of the corporation. Throughout the
historical evolution of the corporation, the three theoretical con-
ceptions of the corporation-the aggregate, artificial entity, and
real entity theories-have been advanced. Remarkably, every time
there was a shift in the role of the corporation, all three theories
were brought forward in cyclical fashion.185 Moreover, in each shift,
the real entity theory prevailed over the other two, and has consis-
tently been the dominant theory during periods of stability in the
relationship between the corporation, the shareholders, and the
state. " 6
The explanation for this persistence of the real entity view is
twofold. First, the real entity view persisted because it represents a
better approximation of reality than the artificial entity view and
aggregate view, and this view became a better approximation as
the corporate form evolved. Roman or medieval corporations
could plausibly be seen as merely creatures of the state because of
the state's role in creating them, or they could be seen as mere ag-
gregations of their members because the members also managed
the corporation. These views are much less plausible today, how-
ever, since the state plays only a minimal role in creating corpora-
tions and that role is sharply constrained by management's ability
to shift the location of incorporation. The shareholders, mean-
"' Thus, the transition from the aggregate view of the corporate tax to the real en-
tity view between 1894 and 1909 can be seen as part of this broader phenomenon,
which was repeated many times throughout the history of corporations.
" See Avi-Yonah, Cyclical Transformations, supra note 184.
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while, are often spread all over the globe and are clearly separate
from the corporate entity.'87
Second, another way of looking at the persistence of the real en-
tity view is that it reflects the power of corporate management.
88
One way of looking at the transformations outlined above is that
both the artificial entity and aggregate views were advanced in or-
der to limit the power of management. The artificial entity view
was usually brought forward in order to enable the state to regulate
corporations, and the aggregate view was usually advanced to en-
hance the power of shareholders, although sometime it was used to
give corporations rights that normally belong only to individuals.9
The ultimate success of the real entity view resulted from the fact
that it gave more power to management than the other views, and
that both legal commentators and courts were ultimately solicitous
of the welfare of corporations (that is, corporate management).
9 0
But the very success of management to persuade courts to adopt
the real entity view also shows that the it is more accurate than the
other views, since it recognizes the power of management. If man-
agement has the power to persuade courts to adopt the real entity
view, that view must also be accurate (or at least more accurate
than the others).
One good way of describing the aggregate view and the artificial
entity view is that they both represent normative aspirations of
their proponents. Those who believe that corporations are insuffi-
ciently regulated by the state advance the artificial entity view to
87 The situation is different in countries with interlocking corporate structures, but
arguably that means that individual shareholders have even less power and manage-
ment is more firmly entrenched. See, e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuck & Mark J. Roe, A
Theory of Path Dependence in Corporate Ownership and Governance, 52 Stan. L.
Rev. 127 (1999) (discussing the role of ownership dispersion on corporate govern-
ance).
" See, e.g., Vikramaditya S. Khanna, Corporate Crime Legislation: A Political
Economy Analysis, 82 Wash. U. L.Q. 95 (2004) (arguing that corporations continue to
be made criminally liable because management prefer criminal to civil liability, and
prefer both to personal liability).
189 See generally Avi-Yonah, Cyclical Transformations, supra note 184 (discussing
the four major corporate transformations and their associated legal conceptions).
'90 But see Hager, supra note 25, at 585 (arguing that the real entity view could
sometimes be used to limit managerial power, for example, to justify corporate crimi-
nal and tort liability); see also E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., For Whom Are Corporate Man-
agers Trustees?, 45 Harv. L. Rev. 1145, 1153-54 (1932) (arguing that the real entity
theory is the foundation for corporate social responsibility).
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justify more regulation. Those, including many current corporate
law scholars, who believe that the biggest problem with corpora-
tions is the agency cost issue-that is, that managers are insuffi-
ciently attentive to the welfare of shareholders-advance the aggre-
gate view.91 Neither of these views actually describes corporations as
they actually operate in the real world-they represent idealized,
normatively based descriptions of what corporations would look
like in a better world.1"
To see what corporations look like in the real world, a more ac-
curate perspective is available in the sociological literature.193 As
one sociologist has stated, "The recurrent problem in sociology is
to conceive of corporate organization, and to study it, in ways that
do not anthropomorphize it and do not reduce it to the behavior of
individuals or of human aggregates."194 A whole branch of eco-
nomic sociology centers on the study of organizations, and there
191 For the classic expositions, see Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The
Economic Structure of Corporate Law (1991); Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz,
Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization, 62 Am. Econ. Rev. 777
(1972); Eugene F. Fama & Michael C. Jensen, Separation of Ownership and Control,
26 J.L. & Econ. 301 (1983); Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the
Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. Fin. Econ.
305 (1976). As stated by two of its original proponents, under this view, the various
participants in the corporation do not differ "in the slightest degree from ordinary
market contracting between any two people." Alchian & Demsetz, supra, at 777.
"Ownership of the firm disappears as a meaningful concept under this model because
no one can own a 'nexus.' ... Control is reflected in the terms of various contracts en-
tered into by individuals." Lynne L. Dallas, Two Models of Corporate Governance:
Beyond Berle and Means, 22 U. Mich. J.L. Reform 19, 23 (1988).
The contractarian view almost became the law in the 1980s. See Edgar v. MITE
Corp., 457 U.S. 624 (1982). In CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp., 481 U.S. 69 (1987),
however, the Supreme Court decided not to adopt this view-probably for the better,
given that it is unclear that an unfettered market for corporate control would have
been socially beneficial. For instance, recent attempts to align the interests of man-
agement with shareholders via stock options have had detrimental consequences, in-
centivizing managers to artificially inflate earnings per share to keep up stock values.
The Enron and Worldcom scandals are the latest and most publicized examples. Re-
cent Law and Economics scholarship is in fact beginning to recognize the crucial im-
portance of managerial power in contexts like setting executive compensation. See
Lucian Arye Bebchuck & Jesse M. Fried, Executive Compensation as an Agency
Problem, 17 J. of Econ. 71 (2003).
"' This view stems from the work of Durkheim, who was the first to focus on groups
as being more than the sum of their members. See Hager, supra note 25, at 582.
194 Guy E. Swanson, The Tasks of Sociology, 192 Sci. (n.s.) 665, 666 (1976).
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are numerous books devoted to the topic.' 5 Most of these books
revolve around the study of large corporations, since these are the
dominant forms of organization in this society.'96 Moreover, they
are informed by the economic perspective inaugurated by Ronald
Coase in his classic The Nature of the Firm article from 1937,97 and
developed by Oliver Williamson and others into transaction-cost
economics.19 This branch of economics, which now forms part of
the "new institutional economics," begins by recognizing that the
firm is fundamentally different from the market because of its hi-
erarchical structure and proceeds to investigate when operating as
a vertically-integrated firm as opposed to buying in the market
makes sense (the "make or buy" issue).9 9 Recently, transaction-
cost economics has become the leading explanation for the most
recent transformation of the corporation-the rise of MNEs.2°
From a normative perspective, the key observation that emerges
from this literature is that corporate managers have power, defined
as the ability to influence the behavior of others, or more generally
"the ability to get what one wants,"2 ' by virtue of their position at
the top of the corporate hierarchy and the financial resources they
control."2 The economist Kenneth Boulding, for example, distin-
"'See, e.g., The Handbook of Economic Sociology (Neil J. Smelser & Richard
Swedberg eds., 1994) (see especially Part II.C, The Sociology of Firms, Organizations,
and Industry); Jeffrey Pfeffer & Gerald R. Salancik, The External Control of Organi-
zations: A Resource Dependence Perspective (1978); W. Richard Scott, Organiza-
tions: Rational, Natural, and Open Systems (3d ed. 1992); The New Institutionalism in
Organizational Analysis (Walter W. Powell & Paul J. DiMaggio eds., 1991); James D.
Thompson, Organizations in Action: Social Science Bases of Administrative Theory
(1967).
196 See, e.g., Roy, supra note 3 (discussing the rise of the large-scale corporation).
'9 R.H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 Economica (n.s.) 386 (1937).
8 Oliver E. Williamson, Transaction Cost Economics and Organization Theory, in
The Handbook of Economic Sociology, supra note 195, at 77. For a critique, see Mark
Granovetter, Economic Action and Social Structure: The Problem of Embeddedness,
91 Am. J. Soc. 481 (1985).
9 See Williamson, supra note 198.
2See The Nature of the Transnational Firm (Christos N. Pitelis & Roger Sugden
eds., 1991) (see especially Chapter 2).
20! Kenneth E. Boulding, Three Faces of Power 15 (1989).
This was still the prevalent view in 1959. See Abram Chayes, The Modern Corpo-
ration and the Rule of Law, in The Corporation in Modern Society 25, 25 (Edward S.
Mason ed., 1959). This view has now been largely replaced by the nexus of contracts
theory. See Bratton, supra note 25, at 1473 (calling the power-centered view "man-
agerialist").
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guishes between threat, economic, and integrative power (the stick,
the carrot, and the hug);23 all three may be ascribed to corpora-
tions. The political scientist Joseph Nye distinguishes between
"hard" power (military and economic) and "soft" power (cultural
power, or the ability to persuade others to want to be more like
you) and describes how the major U.S. MNEs wield both hard and
soft power.2' Likewise, distinguished tax scholars like Professors
Richard Musgrave and William Andrews have recognized that con-
trol over financial resources is a source of power beyond the pure
ability to consume. 5 In fact, corporate management are the best
example of this point because they typically cannot consume cor-
porate resources directly, yet they derive significant power from
controlling those resources.2'
203Boulding, supra note 201, at 24-25. For other discussions of the nature of power,
see generally Valeri G. Ledyaev, Power: A Conceptual Analysis (1997); Power (Ste-
ven Lukes ed., 1986); 1-3 Power: Critical Concepts (John Scott ed., 1994); Power in
Modern Societies (Marvin E. Olsen & Martin N. Marger eds., 1993).
204Joseph S. Nye, Jr., The Paradox of American Power: Why the World's Only
Superpower Can't Go It Alone 8-9 (2003).
2 5 Richard A. Musgrave, Clarifying Tax Reform, 70 Tax Notes 731, 733-34 (1996);
see also Institute for Fiscal Studies, The Structure and Reform of Direct Taxation 351
(1978) ("The holding of wealth itself... can confer on the owner benefits of security,
independence, influence and power, quite apart from any expenditure which the in-
come from it may finance."); Anne L. Alstott, The Uneasy Liberal Case Against In-
come and Wealth Transfer Taxation: A Response to Professor McCafferey, 51 Tax L.
Rev. 363, 371-72 (1996) (discussing political influence and wealth); William D. An-
drews, Fairness and the Personal Income Tax: A Reply to Professor Warren, 88 Harv.
L. Rev. 947, 956 (1975) ("It may well be unacceptable to rely solely on consumption
as a personal tax base because for some people wealth has a welfare value above and
beyond the deferred consumption it may operate to support.").
2'6 Daniel Shaviro argues to the contrary that many believe that wealthy people
escape the burden of a consumption tax by deferring their consumption, and
that advocates of such a tax ignore the effects of unconsumed wealth on one's
security, political power, and social standing. The argument overlooks the fact
that what makes wealth valuable ... is the real purchasing power that it com-
mands. Otherwise, real money would be no different than Monopoly money. A
consumption tax affects the purchasing power even of unspent wealth, and the
burden it imposes generally is not reduced by deferring one's consumption.
Daniel Shaviro, Replacing the Income Tax With a Progressive Consumption Tax, 103
Tax Notes 91 (2004). This is wrong because the power of the wealthy (and of corpo-
rate management) stems primarily from their ability to invest, not consume, their
wealth, and investments are by definition not curtailed by a consumption tax.
1236
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B. The Nature of Corporate Power
The sociological literature indicates that corporate (managerial)
power can generally be divided into three categories. 7 The first is
political power-the power of management to affect political out-
comes by lobbying and political contributions. That power is
somewhat constrained by campaign finance reform laws. Those
laws (including most recently McCain-Feingold), however, are
generally recognized as not very effective, and decisions like First
National Bank v. Bellotti.°8 enhance corporate power. Moreover,
even if campaign finance reform completely banned political con-
tributions by corporations (indirect as well as direct), corporate
lobbying would still be effective to the extent corporations have
power over the lives of voters in the politician's constituency.
The second category of corporate power is economic power,
which applies directly to corporate employees and indirectly to
communities in which corporations have significant facilities. While
the relationship between shareholders and management can per-
haps plausibly be analyzed in purely contractual terms (sharehold-
ers are free to sell), the same cannot be said of many situations in-
volving corporate employees."° Employees have invested human
207The point that corporate management have power was clearly seen in 1932 by
Berle and Means, who wrote:
The economic power in the hands of the few persons who control a giant corpo-
ration is a tremendous force which can harm or benefit a multitude of individu-
als, affect whole districts, shift the currents of trade, bring ruin to one commu-
nity and prosperity to another. The organizations which they control have
passed far beyond the realm of private enterprise-they have become more
nearly social institutions.
Berle & Means, supra note 58, at 46. When this was written, over one-third of the na-
tional wealth of the country was administered by some two hundred corporations
which in turn were dominated by a few hundred men. See id. at 46 n.34. Today, multi-
national enterprises produce about 10% of world GDP. See Reuven S. Avi-Yonah,
National Regulation of Multinational Enterprises: An Essay on Comity, Extraterrito-
riality, and Harmonization, 42 Colum. J. Transnat'l L. 6, 6 (2003) [hereinafter Avi-
Yonah, National Regulation].
208 435 U.S. 765, 776 (1978) (recognizing a First Amendment right of corporations to
engage in political speech). For a trenchant critique, see Hager, supra note 25, at 640-
41; Carl J. Mayer, Personalizing the Impersonal: Corporations and the Bill of Rights,
41 Hastings L.J. 577, 615-16 (1990).
209 But see, e.g., Thomas Lee Hazen, The Corporate Persona, Contract (and Market)
Failure, and Moral Values, 69 N.C. L. Rev. 273 (1991) (critiquing the contractarian
paradigm even in the shareholder context).
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capital in corporations and may find it difficult to find another em-
ployer except at significant costs (for example, the costs of moving
to a distant city), especially in industries characterized by monop-
oly or oligopoly (for example, Microsoft, Intel, Boeing, and Wal-
Mart). Nor is contract the best way to describe the relationship be-
tween corporations and their communities. When a major corpora-
tion closes a plant or moves its headquarters, the effects are felt by
both the employees and the community. In general, the presence of
corporate headquarters in particular is associated with positive ex-
ternalities that are not reflected in any contractual arrangement. It
is very hard to regulate this kind of corporate power without un-
duly restricting corporate economic flexibility; hence, even union-
ized plants are not immune to closing. In addition, this is the kind
of power that makes developing countries feel so dependent on
MNEs and their decisions on where to open new plants.
The third category of corporate power, which exists only spo-
radically but is crucial in several cases, is market power over con-
sumers. Market power exists in several industries through monop-
oly or oligopoly. The antitrust laws regulate this power to a certain
extent, but as was shown recently in the case of Microsoft, their ul-
timate reach is limited." ' Under the "rule of reason" adopted by
the Supreme Court upon breaking up The Standard Oil Company,
market domination by itself is not sufficient to invoke antitrust
laws.21 ' A similar rule applies in Europe because it is only abuse of
a dominant position (not the position itself) that is actionable." '
C. Two Arguments for Restricting Corporate Power
What are the normative consequences of the recognition of cor-
porate managerial power? There are two principal arguments why
a liberal democratic state should curb excessive accumulations of
private power. The first is the argument from democracy-in a
democracy, all power should ultimately be accountable to the peo-
ple. " Private accumulations of power are by definition unaccount-
210 United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (per curiam).
211 Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 62 (1911).
212 2 Barry E. Hawk, United States, Common Market and International Antitrust: A
Comparative Guide 827 (2d ed. 1994).
213 This view is further explored in Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Why Tax the Rich? Effi-
ciency, Equity, and Progressive Taxation, 111 Yale L.J. 1391, 1406-07 (2002) (book
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able since the holders of power are neither elected by the people
nor have their power delegated by the people's representatives. In
fact, the American Revolution was founded on the conception that
while people have natural, Lockean liberal rights to their property,
undue concentrations of private power and wealth should be dis-
couraged."' This view found its expression in the republican creed
of civic humanism, which emphasized public virtue as a balance to
private rights.215 A virtuous republic, the Founders believed, was to
be free from concentrations of economic power such as character-
ized England in the eighteenth century. 16 Therefore, from the be-
ginning of the Republic, federal and state legislators used taxation
to restrict privilege and to "affirm communal responsibilities,
deepen citizenship, and demonstrate the fiscal virtues of a republi-
can citizenry., 217 As Professor Dennis Ventry has written, "The
ideal of civic virtue created a unique form of ability-to-pay taxation
that was hostile to excess accumulation and to citizens who as-
serted entitlement through birth .... Inherited wealth, as well as
gross concentrations of wealth (inherited or not), characterized an
aristocratic society, not a free and virtuous republic. ' '218 In the
twentieth century, the same view was best expressed in the corpo-
rate context by Berle, who wrote that in a democracy like the
United States
it becomes necessary to present a system (none has been pre-
sented) of law or government, or both, by which responsibility
for control of national wealth and income is so apportioned and
enforced that the community as a whole, or at least the great
bulk of it, is properly taken care of. Otherwise the economic
power now mobilized and massed under the corporate form.. . is
simply handed over, weakly, to the present administrators with a
pious wish that something nice will come out of it all.219
review) [hereinafter Avi-Yonah, Progressive Taxation], where it is argued that limit-
in private power is the best argument for taxing the rich.
1'Ventry, supra note 82, at 28.
215 Id.
216 Id.
217 Brownlee, supra note 82, at 31.
211 Ventry, supra note 82, at 28.
21' A.A. Berle, Jr., For Whom Corporate Managers Are Trustees: A Note, 45 Harv.
L. Rev. 1365, 1368 (1932). It is ironic that Berle is sometimes regarded as a progenitor
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The other principal argument against excessive corporate power is
based on a liberal conception of equality. Professor Michael Wal-
zer has explained that when liberals talk about equality, they are
not concerned with "simple equality," or equalizing everyone's ini-
tial means.22° Instead, they are advocating "complex equality," by
which Walzer means that every social "sphere" should have its own
appropriate distributive principles and that possession of goods
relevant to one sphere should not automatically translate into
dominance in other spheres as well.2 ' "In formal terms, complex
equality means that no citizen's standing in one sphere or with re-
gard to one social good can be undercut by his standing in some
other sphere, with regard to some other good., 22 In our capitalist
society, money is the "dominant good," and the people who pos-
sess it are the most likely to accumulate illegitimate power in other
spheres, such as politics. 22 "This dominant good is more or less sys-
tematically converted into all sorts of other things-opportunities,
,,224powers, and reputations. Walzer goes on to explain the insidious
effects of money and why it needs to be curbed by redistribution,
including redistributive taxation:
Market imperialism requires another sort of redistribution,
which is not so much a matter of drawing a line as of redrawing
it. What is at issue now is the dominance of money outside its
sphere, the ability of wealthy men and women to trade in in-
dulgences, purchase state offices, corrupt the courts, exercise
political power.... [T]he exercise of power belongs to the
sphere of politics, while what goes on in the market should at
least approximate an exchange between equals (a free ex-
of the current nexus of contracts approach. See also Hager, supra note 25, at 639
("Such [corporate] power, insulated from participation, criticism, or revision by a
public which cannot escape its effects, poses an enormous obstacle toward achieving
maximum democratic control over the condition of social life.").
220 Michael Walzer, Spheres of Justice: A Defense of Pluralism and Equality 13-17
(1983).
221 Id. at 19-20.
222 Id. at 19; see also Don Herzog, Happy Slaves: A Critique of Consent Theory 148-
81 (1989) (describing liberal "differentiation" between different spheres).
223 Walzer, supra note 220, at 11.
2' Id. at 12.
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change) .... When money carries with it the control, not of things
only but of people, too, it ceases to be a private resource.225
Nor, as is noted above, is the power of money limited to direct po-
litical power:
It would be a mistake to imagine, however, that money has
political effects only when it "talks" to candidates and offi-
cials.... It also has political effects closer to home, in the market
itself and in its firms and enterprises.... Even within the adver-
sary relation of owners and workers, with unions and grievance
procedures in place, owners may still exercise an illegitimate kind
of power. They make all sorts of decisions that severely constrain
and shape the lives of their employees (and their fellow citizens,
too). Might not the enormous capital investment represented by
plants, furnaces, machines, and assembly lines be better regarded
as a political than an economic good? To say this doesn't mean
that it can't be shared among individuals in a variety of ways, but
only that it shouldn't carry the conventional entailments of own-
ership. Beyond a certain scale, the means of production are not
properly called commodities... for they generate a kind of
power that lifts them out of the economic sphere."'
Walzer thus advocates taxation as one means of restricting the
market to its proper sphere (along with trade unions and limiting
property rights). But he also recognizes the inherent limitations of
all redistribution, since his aim is not to abolish the market:
All three redistributions redraw the line between politics and
economics, and they do so in ways that strengthen the sphere of
politics-the hand of citizens, that is, not necessarily the power of
the state.... But however strong their hand, citizens can't just
make any decisions they please. The sphere of politics has its
own boundaries.... Hence redistribution can never produce
simple equality, not so long as money and commodities still exist,
and there is some legitimate social space within which they can
be exchanged ....
221 Id. at 120-21.
226 Id. at 121-22; see also id. at 301-03 (discussing "company towns").
227 Id. at 122-23.
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D. Ways of Limiting Corporate Power
How can corporate power be limited? It depends on the type of
power. Political power can most obviously be restricted by placing
direct limits on campaign contributions, which are an incredibly
cheap sort of power for large corporations-a whole campaign can
be financed for a few million dollars, whereas an elected politician
can make decisions worth billions. Admittedly, since corporations
were first banned from directly contributing to political campaigns
in 1907, this kind of limitation has not been effective.228 The very
political power of corporations seems to ensure that campaign fi-
nance reform is hard to pass and riddled with loopholes, and Su-
preme Court decisions like First National Bank v. Bellotti do not
help. Nevertheless, it is conceivable that the direct political power
of corporations could be limited by campaign finance reform. The
problem, however, is that this will by no means eliminate the po-
litical power of corporations because that power stems from their
economic power. As long as General Motors and Ford employ tens
of thousands of Michigan voters, their views will resonate with the
Michigan delegation to Congress, even if they are strictly prohib-
ited from donating a penny to any politician (directly or indirectly).
The market power that some corporations possess can be limited
through the antitrust laws. Having said that, though, it is important
to note that for the past forty years antitrust law has been moving
away from curbing corporate market power and toward ensuring
that consumers do not pay higher prices.29 The shift in focus from
curbing corporate size and power to consumer protection is par-
ticularly striking in U.S. antitrust law and is evidenced by the fail-
ure of the government to break up monopolies like IBM in the
1970s or Microsoft in the 1990s. In Europe, there is more of a focus
on preventing "abuse of a dominant position" even if it only hurts
competitors rather than consumers, but even there, it is the abuse
rather than the dominant position itself that is at stake.23 But even
if U.S. antitrust law were changed to refocus more directly on cor-
221 See, e.g., Tillman Act, ch. 420, 34 Stat. 864 (1907).
...See Philip Areeda & Louis Kaplow, Antitrust Analysis: Problems, Text, and
Cases 26, 828-29 (5th ed. 1997) (discussing Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S.
294 (1962)).
2 2 Hawke, supra note 212, at 827.
HeinOnline  -- 90 Va. L. Rev. 1242 2004
Corporations, Society, and the State
porate market power (and that would be a radical redirection), it is
still a very unwieldy and imprecise tool. Proving antitrust violations
is hard and in the case of large corporations can take years of litiga-
tion. Additionally, courts typically shy away from the breakup
remedy because they fear damaging the corporation in the eco-
nomic sphere where the benefits of its existence are most clearly
felt.
231
Finally, it should be emphasized that curbing corporate power
cannot be achieved through corporate governance reform. It may
be possible to place limits on the power of corporate management
vis-A-vis shareholders in this way, although once more the power of
management makes this very difficult to do (as shown by the rise
and fall of the market for corporate control). 232 But even if man-
agement were to operate perfectly in the interests of the share-
holders, they would still, from my perspective, exercise excessive
power over the rest of society. It is that power that the corporate
tax seeks to curb. By definition, corporate governance reforms
cannot hinder management when they exercise power in ways that
are beneficial to shareholders. 3
In the final analysis, the problem of corporate power can only be
addressed by direct regulation of the kind of activities we want
corporations to perform, namely production and distribution of
goods and services. Some of these activities may have negative ex-
ternalities that are best regulated by, for example, labor, safety, or
environmental laws. But these laws will still do nothing to limit
corporate power that is exercised by producing and distributing
231 See, e.g., United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 46-47 (D.C. Cir. 2001)
(per curiam) (reversing and remanding most of the District Court judgment requiring
a break-up).
232 See, e.g., Paramount Communications v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1155 (Del.
1989) (rejecting shareholder action against Time's tender offer).
233 Oliver Hart, for example, has argued that corporate debt can be used to discipline
managers: corporations use a lot of debt so that managers will not squander too much
of shareholders' money, and the corporate tax assists in this function. See Oliver Hart,
Firms, Contracts, and Financial Structure 95-120 (1995); see also Joseph E. Stiglitz,
Taxation, Corporate Financial Policy, and the Cost of Capital, 2 J. Pub. Econ 1, 4-5
(1973) (noting that corporations can avoid tax by using debt). While debt might help
restrict managerial power vis-A-vis shareholders, and to some extent vis-a-vis society
as well (and that is a good reason to allow corporations to deduct interest), debt can-
not limit managerial use of equity or retained earnings. As noted below, it may from
this perspective also be acceptable to let corporations deduct dividends.
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goods and services in an environmentally sound and safe way.
Given that we do not want government to tell corporate manage-
ment directly how to run their business (that idea was tried and
failed in the socialist economies), only the tax law can directly
reach these types of activities, which are the ultimate source of
corporate power accumulation.
E. The Regulatory Rationale for the Corporate Tax
My basic argument is therefore that the corporate tax is justified
as a means to control the excessive accumulation of power in the
hands of corporate management, which is inconsistent with a
properly functioning liberal democratic polity. 5 As I have argued
above, this was also the principal reason why the corporate tax was
enacted in 1909,6 and I believe is also the principal reason for its
political resiliency today. People understand that corporations are
powerful and that the corporate tax is one way in which the state,
as representative of the people, can limit their power.237
2 The idea that the tax was a regulatory tool is hinted at in Mayer, supra note 208,
at 583, and raised but rejected by Musgrave & Musgrave, supra note 45, at 374-75.
Except for brief mention in Walzer, supra note 220, at 121-23, I have not found it
elsewhere.
15 See Walzer, supra note 220, at 121-23; Herzog, supra note 222, at 169-70. From
this perspective the "incidence" of the corporate tax is on management, since they are
the ones whose power is diminished by it. This is a separate question from the knotty
problem of who bears the burden of the corporate tax in the sense that their own re-
sources are diminished by it. It is important to note, however, that if one could show
that the incidence of the corporate tax is actually shifted to consumers or labor, then
presumably management would not care that the tax was imposed since it would not
actually diminish the resources they control. This would eliminate the regulatory ra-
tionale for the tax. But forty years of research on incidence by economists has failed
to demonstrate that the tax can in fact be shifted in most cases, at least in the long
run. See the incidence literature, supra note 34. And corporate management certainly
seem to care enough about the corporate tax to engage in significant tax planning to
try to avoid it as much as possible. See, for example, the tax shelters literature, supra
note 16.
3' See supra Section II.B.
237 One interesting corollary of this view is that the corporate tax should apply to
non-profit corporations (which have no shareholders) since their management have as
much power as the management of for-profit entities. But I accept the mainstream
view that they should not be taxed because not-for-profits perform functions that
would otherwise fall to the state. See, e.g., Henry B. Hansmann, The Role of Non-
profit Enterprise, 89 Yale L.J. 835, 836-37 (1980). It is interesting to consider the mir-
ror image of this argument-that for-profit corporations should be taxed because
their management choose not to address problems they could help solve and there-
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This argument has particular resonance today as a result of the
rise of MNEs. As many academics have pointed out, the rise of
MNEs has significantly weakened the regulatory power of the state
since MNEs by definition operate across jurisdictions and can set
one jurisdiction off against another.2" Taxation is one vehicle of
regulation and an area in which extraterritorial jurisdiction is well
established in international law.239 Therefore, it offers a promising
venue to regulate MNEs.2 °
It should also be noted that this rationale for the tax applies
more or less precisely to the current scope of the tax we have to-
day-that is, a tax imposed primarily on publicly traded enter-
prises, because it is only those that exhibit the separation of owner-
ship from control."' This rationale can also explain why we tax
corporate equity but not debt, since issuing debt constrains mana-
gerial power in ways that issuing equity does not (as many of the
leveraged buyout targets of the 1980s discovered). 42
fore create more work for the state. This requires considering the debate on corporate
social responsibility, which is a topic for another day.
21 See generally, Philip I. Blumberg, The Multinational Challenge to Corporation
Law (1993) (discussing the interaction of jurisdictions in relation to MNEs); Raymond
Vernon, In The Hurricane's Eye: The Troubled Prospects of Multinational Enter-
prises (1998) (same); Avi-Yonah, National Regulation, supra note 207 (discussing
specific areas of conflict between states regarding MNEs).
239 See, for example, I.R.C. §§ 951-960 (2000), for the tax treatment of controlled
foreign corporations.2
' Avi-Yonah, National Regulation, supra note 207, at 23-24. Taxation falls in the
right column and middle row of the matrix developed in that article to distinguish
various areas of state regulation of MNEs. That is, it is an area in which extraterritori-
ality is required and countries (but not MNEs) agree on its basic principles. Id. at 11.
24 This is contrary to the view expressed by Schlunk, who argues that "there is no
colorable justification for the double taxation scheme currently imposed in the United
States" (that is, a tax imposed almost entirely on equity capital of publicly traded en-
terprises, with full taxation of dividends when distributed). Schlunk, supra note 10, at
332. Admittedly, from a power perspective the tax could be limited to large corpora-
tions, such as the S&P 500, which account for a large part of the corporate tax base.
An exemption of the first $100 million would be acceptable, just as I support exempt-
ing the first $100,000 of individual income from the income tax, an idea advocated in
Michael J. Graetz, 100 Million Unnecessary Returns: A Fresh Start for the U.S. Tax
System, 112 Yale L.J. 261, 282 (2002). It could also be argued that corporations can be
powerful without being profitable. This may be true for any given year, but over a
longer run there is a correlation between size, power, and profitability, since the cor-
poration would not grow if it were not profitable.
242 This requires developing ways to distinguish equity from debt. That distinction is
hard to defend theoretically but in practice can be defended; transaction costs make it
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F. Two Regulatory Functions of the Corporate Tax
How does taxation restrict and regulate managerial power? It
does so in two ways. First, by directly limiting the rate of corporate
wealth accumulation (the "limiting function"), and second, by pro-
viding incentives and disincentives to particular corporate activities
(the "regulatory function"). For reasons explained below, both
functions are necessary and related to each other, in the same way
that both a brake and a steering wheel are necessary for driving a
car.
First, the limiting function: Imagine first a 100% tax imposed on
corporate profits. Such a tax would effectively eliminate the corpo-
ration's reason to exist. Over time, it would also eliminate all
sources of corporate power, since it would force the corporation to
use its existing resources to pay politicians and employees, and it
would remove any incentive to sell goods to consumers. Once these
resources are exhausted the corporation would be liquidated. A
100% federal tax (assuming it cannot be avoided) is therefore as
effective a corporate death sentence as the mandatory liquidation
imposed by state courts on the trusts.243 The power to tax is indeed
potentially the power to destroy.
But a 100% tax is inconceivable. Taxation faces an inherent limit
that was well expressed by Justice Holmes when he stated that "the
power to tax is not the power to destroy while this court sits."2
The Constitution places limits on the power to tax, limits that were
already implicitly recognized in Dartmouth College v. Woodward:
The public sector may not use taxation to completely eliminate the
private one. 245 This is both a matter of constitutional law (a tax may
be a taking if the rate exceeds any reasonable estimate of the
state's contribution to private wealth creation)2" and a matter of
practicality-just as in the case of the rich, we do not want to kill
impossible to easily convert all equity into debt, as financial theory would predict.
Otherwise, the $200 billion collected annually by the corporate tax would have van-
ished long ago, as predicted by Stiglitz, supra note 233, at 4.
243 See People v. N. River Sugar Ref. Co., 24 N.E. 834, 841 (N.Y. 1890); State v.
Standard Oil Co., 30 N.E. 279, 291 (Ohio 1892).
214 Panhandle Oil Co. v. Mississippi ex rel. Knox, 277 U.S. 218, 223 (1928) (Holmes,
J., dissenting).
245 See Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 638 (1819).
246 See Liam Murphy & Thomas Nagel, The Myth of Ownership: Taxes and Justice
135 (2002).
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the goose that lays the golden eggs by imposing taxation at rates
that create huge deadweight losses to the economy at large (the
deadweight loss is approximately a square function of the tax
rate).2 7 The precise limit of desirable taxation thus becomes the
quintessential political question of our time, to be refought every
four years at the ballot box.
Given that we cannot tax at 100%, what is the effect on corpo-
rate power of a lower tax rate, such as the current 35%? Even at
that historically low rate,248 the corporate tax does significantly slow
down the accumulation of corporate resources, which are the
foundation of managerial power.2 9 For example, imposing a tax at
35% on corporate assets invested at a 10% yield (compounded an-
nually) over ten years results in approximately 27% less assets be-
ing available to management at the end of the period than would
be available in the absence of the tax.250 Thus, taxation at lower
rates can meaningfully restrict the build-up of assets that form the
base of managerial power, even when it does not destroy it."' But
since corporate power will continue to exist and grow at any rea-
sonable rate of taxation, we also need the tax to perform a regula-
tory function.
247 Harvey S. Rosen, Public Finance 282-301 (6th ed. 2002). It should be noted, how-
ever, that to the extent the corporate tax falls on economic rents, it is not inefficient
even at very high rates. There is a significant literature that suggests that MNEs in
particular earn economic rents. See, for example, Mihir A. Desai & James R. Hines,
Jr., Evaluating International Tax Reform, 56 Nat'l Tax J. 487, 489 (2003), and sources
cited therein.
24 The corporate tax rate was 46% as recently as 1986, and higher before then. See
Friedman, supra note 14, at 8.
249 This assumes that management cannot avoid the tax either by corporate tax shel-
ters or tax competition. These two problems are discussed in Part IV infra. It also as-
sumes that the corporate tax cannot generally be shifted. See Stiglitz, supra note 233,
at 4-5.
2 0One-hundred dollars invested at 10% over ten years, compounded annually,
yields $257 at the end of year ten in the absence of tax and only $188 (27% less) if the
earnings are subject to a 35% tax. The key is of course the effective tax rate. George
Yin has calculated that the effective rate for the S&P 500 is on average about 30%.
Yin, Effective Tax Rates, supra note 15, at 1798.
21' Note that the corporate tax does not limit the absolute size of corporations; it is
not meaningfully progressive and it actually encourages growth through tax-free
mergers and acquisitions. Instead, the corporate tax's limiting function is a way for
government to control the rate of corporate growth, with the implied potential of
stopping it altogether.
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Second, the regulatory function: Managerial use of corporate as-
sets (that is, use of its power) may be impacted by the threat that
the tax rate will rise if Congress perceives that the assets are not
used for the betterment of society. This can be seen by the imposi-
tion of higher effective rates on certain forms of behavior Congress
disapproved of, like bribes paid to foreign officials and participa-
tion in international boycotts.252 In both cases, empirical research
has suggested the tax penalties had a significant impact.253 More re-
cently, the threat of increased tax rates applied to U.S. corpora-
tions that moved their nominal place of incorporation to Bermuda
seems to have sufficed to block one such "inversion" transaction
and stop other corporations from adopting the same strategy.5 4
This is particularly striking since the imposition of an actual tax on
the shareholders of inverting corporations in 1994 had no effect
whatsoever on the rate of inversions;2 5 management does not care
enough about the tax on shareholders. Thus, it seems that just as
Senator Cummins predicted in 1909, taxation even at rates much
less than 100% can suffice to regulate corporate managerial
power. 2" But the rates cannot be set too low (1%, as in 1909, is not
enough), because then management would not care sufficiently to
avoid the tax. This is why we need the limiting function (that is, set
rates at sufficiently high levels for management to notice) for the
regulatory function to work properly.
Finally, in addition to providing disincentives, the tax can be
used to provide incentives as well.257 For example, investment in-
252 I.R.C. §§ 162(c), 908 (2000).
253 James R. Hines, Jr., Taxed Avoidance: American Participation in Unsanctioned
International Boycotts 24 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 6116,
1997); James R. Hines, Jr., Forbidden Payment: Foreign Bribery and American Busi-
ness after 1977, at 20-21 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 5266,
1995).
25
4 See Avi-Yonah, Haven's Sake, supra note 20. There have been no inversions
since Stanley. See David Cay Johnston, Musical Chairs on Tax Havens: Now It's Ire-
land, N.Y. Times, Aug. 3, 2002, at C2.
215 See Avi-Yonah, Haven's Sake, supra note 20, at 1793-94.
256 44 Cong. Rec. 4232 (1909) (statement of Sen. Cummins).
257 This function is controversial. See, e.g., Boris I. Bittker, A "Comprehensive Tax
Base" as a Goal of Income Tax Reform, 80 Harv. L. Rev. 925 (1967) (discussing the
idea of tax expenditures as a departure from an ideal tax base); R. A. Musgrave, In
Defense of an Income Concept, 81 Harv. L. Rev. 44 (1968) (same); David A. Weis-
bach & Jacob Nussim, The Integration of Tax and Spending Programs, 113 Yale L.J.
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centives are provided to corporations as a way of bolstering the
economy."' Another example is research and development, which
has been shown by economists to produce significant positive ex-
ternalities for society, which justify government in providing a sub-
sidy via the tax code. 259 Now it is of course true that the government
could subsidize these functions directly, rather than use tax expen-
ditures, so that this cannot strictly be an argument for taxing cor-
porations. That would require, however, setting up an IRS-like
agency to monitor the use of the subsidies, so that any simplifica-
tion advantage from abolishing the corporate tax is diminished.
Additionally, once the corporate tax is in place, it seems like an
obvious and convenient vehicle to deliver the desired subsidies at
little additional cost.
G. Summary
The corporate tax is justified as a way for a liberal democratic
state to limit excessive accumulations of power in the hands of cor-
porate management, which is inconsistent with both democratic
and egalitarian ideals. It achieves this goal in two ways: by directly
limiting the rate of corporate wealth accumulation and by regulat-
ing managerial uses of corporate assets and channeling it in direc-
tions deemed beneficial to society as a whole. Neither of these
functions can be effectively achieved in a capitalist economy by
means other than a corporate tax imposed at a significant rate. The
corporate tax can thus be seen as an essential part of a liberal de-
mocratic alternative to a socialist command and control economy.
In the last Part, I discuss some practical implications that follow
from this argument.
(forthcoming 2004) (same); Daniel Shaviro, Rethinking Tax Expenditures (2004)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with Virginia Law Review Association) (same).
28See Ronald F. King, Money, Time & Politics: Investment Tax Subsidies and
American Democracy 1-8 (1993).
29 James R. Hines, Jr., International Taxation and Corporate R&D, in Borderline
Case: International Tax Policy, Corporate Research and Development, and Invest-
ment 39, 39 (James M. Poterba ed., 1997).
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IV. SOME POLICY IMPLICATIONS
The first and most obvious practical conclusion from the above is
the negative one: The corporate tax should not be repealed. 2' This
outcome seems at present unlikely, but it is important to stress it
because of the widespread opposition to (or very lukewarm sup-
port for) the corporate tax in academic and policy circles.
There are three areas in which one can draw more specific policy
conclusions from the above arguments. These are the two most
significant threats to the corporate tax-corporate tax shelters and
tax competition-and the current drive to reform the tax by inte-
grating it with shareholder (dividend) taxation.
A. Corporate Tax Shelters
Since the mid-1990s, the corporate tax in the United States has
been under significant practical attack by the growing corporate
tax shelter movement.261 Its essence involves promoters (mostly ac-
counting firms and investment banks) who scour the Code for shel-
tering ideas and then sell them for a hefty fee to a growing list of
corporate clients. Ten years ago it was unusual to find mainstream
corporate tax departments who would buy these ideas. Today, with
the tax department viewed as a profit center, it is rare to find a ma-
jor corporation that does not use them. As Professor John
260 The same applies to the corporate Alternative Minimum Tax, which I view as an
important backstop to the corporate tax. See Reuven Avi-Yonah, The Case for Re-
taining the Corporate AMT, 56 SMU L. Rev. 333 (2003).
261 See, e.g., Bankman, supra note 16, at 1776-80 (describing the features of modem
tax shelters); Peter C. Canellos, A Tax Practitioner's Perspective on Substance, Form
and Business Purpose in Structuring Business Transactions and in Tax Shelters, 54
SMU L. Rev. 47, 47 (2001) ("[C]orporate tax shelters are proliferating, in both type
and number, and their terms are becoming ever more audacious."); Daniel N.
Shaviro, Economic Substance, Corporate Tax Shelters, and the Compaq Case, 88 Tax
Notes 221, 223-24 (2000) (describing dividend-stripping); David A. Weisbach, Ten
Truths About Tax Shelters, 55 Tax L. Rev. 215, 226 (2002) (describing "audit lottery"
theory); George K. Yin, The Problem of Corporate Tax Shelters: Uncertain Dimen-
sions, Unwise Approaches, 55 Tax L. Rev. 405, 405 (2002) (noting that the Treasury
Department has described tax shelters as proliferating and urged efforts to curb their
growth); Yin, Tax Shelters, supra note 16, at 209 (noting that "respected commenta-
tors both inside and outside of government seem persuaded" that tax shelters are a
problem).
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Braithwaite noted, the phenomenon is both supply and demand
driven.262
Various proposals have been advanced to curb this practice, and
the IRS has issued elaborate regulations.263 Courts (especially ap-
pellate courts with little tax expertise), however, have tended to
uphold the shelters." It therefore seems that more drastic action is
needed to address this problem. Professor George Yin has pro-
posed a solution based on making tax reporting conform better to
financial (book) reporting.2 5 I support this idea because it would
exact a price (in the form of higher tax payments) from corporate
management who manipulate financial reporting, and if manage-
ment chooses to employ tax shelters this would result in reduced
earnings per share ("EPS"). Since management tend to care more
about short-term EPS than about taxes266 such a rule (which is simi-
lar to the rule adopted in other countries, such as Germany and Ja-
pan) is likely to be more effective in curbing tax shelters than fi-
nancial manipulation, although it also has some drawbacks in terms
of reduced flexibility for both tax and accounting rulemakers.
In any case, whatever the solution adopted for the tax shelter
problem, the important point derived from this Article is that it is
indeed a problem-that from a normative perspective it is not
good to let management eliminate the corporate tax through self-
help measures. This point is missing from the corporate tax shelter
literature, but it is essential to it.
262 John Braithwaite, Helter Shelter: Marketing Local and Global Aggressive Tax
Planning (forthcoming 2004) (manuscript at 2, on file with the Virginia Law Review
Association).
263 See, e.g., I.R.C. § 6111 (2000) (requiring registration of tax shelters).
264 See, e.g., Compaq Computer Corp. v. Comm'r, 277 F.3d 778, 781-83 (5th Cir.
2001); United Parcel Serv. v. Comm'r, 254 F.3d 1014, 1018-20 (11th Cir. 2001).
265 See Yin, Tax Shelters, supra note 16, at 230.
266 See, for example, the debate on pooling versus purchase accounting for mergers.
See Barton Massey, Banking Association Asks FASB to Preserve Pooling Method, 86
Tax Notes 1125, 1125 (2000); Joseph McNamara, Despite Criticism, FASB Won't Al-
ter Plans to Eliminate Pooling, 86 Tax Notes 1259, 1259-60 (2000); Joseph McNa-
mara, FASB Eliminates Pooling of Interests, 90 Tax Notes 802, 802 (2001). Under
pooling, earnings per share were higher than under purchase because the latter re-
quired amortizing goodwill.
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B. Tax Competition
The other main challenge to the corporate tax is tax competition
involving MNEs. Currently, some major U.S. MNEs (for example,
Intel) pay no tax to non-U.S. jurisdictions because all of their for-
eign operations benefit from special tax holidays designed to at-
tract the investment.267 The MNEs can be sure to obtain such tax
reductions because they can conduct an auction among the several
countries that offer equivalently suitable locations for untaxed in-
vestment. More recently, we have seen tax competition flare up in
the location of corporate headquarters, with several U.S. MNEs
moving their nominal location of incorporation to tax havens like
Bermuda.268
The OECD and the European Union have both launched pro-
jects aimed at curbing such tax competition, but so far they have
achieved only limited success.269 In the academic literature, mean-
while, there is a raging debate between those who believe that tax
competition is harmful and those who believe it is beneficial either
from a global perspective or from the perspective of the countries
involved.270 Opponents have suggested various ways of combating
tax competition, most of which involve some form of cooperation
among developed countries (for example, taxing MNEs based on
where their headquarters are or where their goods are sold). 7 '
There is, however, a major missing element in this literature-
even the opponents of tax competition (including myself) have not
been successful in explaining why the threat posed by it to the cor-
porate tax should be viewed negatively. The best we could do is to
point out the threat posed by it to the welfare state. ' But this just
leads to the counter-charge that bloated welfare leviathans are try-
ing to create a cartel to save themselves from efficient competition
at the expense of small Caribbean jurisdictions.273
267 Avi-Yonah, Globalization, supra note 13, at 1589.
26 Avi-Yonah, Haven's Sake, supra note 20, at 1794.
'69Avi-Yonah, Globalization, supra note 13, at 1670.
27 Id. at 1603-10; Roin, supra note 18, at 603-04.
21'Avi-Yonah, Globalization, supra note 13, at 1670-71. The rise of inversions raises
some doubt about taxation based purely on where the parent corporation is incorpo-
rated. See Avi-Yonah, Haven's Sake, supra note 20, at 1796-97.
272 Avi-Yonah, Globalization, supra note 13, at 1632-39.
273 See, e.g., Daniel J. Mitchell, OECD Tax Competition Proposal: Higher Taxes and
Less Privacy, 89 Tax Notes 801, 802 (2000).
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This Article, I believe, supplies the missing piece in the arma-
ment of tax competition opponents by pointing out the negative
consequences of abolishing the corporate tax through self-help, be-
yond the damage caused to the coffers of the developed countries.
If management can defeat regulation by taxation through the sim-
ple mechanism of going overseas, the efficacy of the tax as a regu-
latory mechanism is eliminated.
C. Integration
In early 2003, President Bush proposed to integrate the corpo-
rate tax and the individual shareholder tax by exempting share-
holders from paying tax on dividends, as long as the dividends were
paid from after-tax corporate earnings.274 Eventually, Congress
balked at adopting full integration and instead opted to reduce the
tax rate on dividends from 35% to 15% (with the same rate apply-
ing to capital gains).275 Significantly, the lower rate on dividends
applies whether or not corporate tax has been paid.276
Thus, for the first time since 1936, the United States now has a
partially integrated corporate tax system. Indeed, if the corporate
tax can be eliminated by self-help (by tax shelters or tax competi-
tion), it is now possible for a corporate investment to be taxed at a
total rate of 15%-significantly lower than non-corporate invest-
ment .
This result is of course inconsistent with the stated rationales for
adopting integration, which have to do with taxing corporate in-
come once. 7" But even the economic case for the original Bush
proposal, which did not envisage this kind of "super-integration,"
was debatable.7 9 In particular, integration introduces economic bi-
ases in regard to cross-border investment that may be no less sig-
nificant than the biases it attempts to cure domestically.
From the perspective of this Article, the important point to note
is that the rationale given for the corporate tax is independent from
the tax on shareholders. Thus, it is entirely consistent to tax corpo-
274 U.S. Treasury Dep't, supra note 7.
271 I.R.C. § 1 (h)(11) (2000).
276 Id.
277 See Avi-Yonah, Pitfalls, supra note 31, at 1.
271 Id. at 2.
279 See Id.
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rations on their income to regulate management, while at the same
time taxing shareholders on dividends.' The tax on dividends has
to do with the rationale for having an individual income tax (rather
than, for example, a Value-Added Tax). I have argued elsewhere
that this rationale was to restrict the power of the rich."'
It should also be noted that the rationale given above for retain-
ing the corporate tax does not require us to forego integration. As
long as the corporate tax is maintained, it is quite possible to ex-
empt shareholders from tax on dividends or give them a credit for
economic reasons, without causing harm to the rationale for the
corporate tax. In fact, shareholders were partially exempted from
tax on dividends from 1913 to 1936, when the regulatory rationale
for the tax was well understood."2 Thus, although this Article gives
an answer to why we should tax corporations that is different from
the mainstream view that is cited to support integration, it does not
necessarily follow from it that we should refrain from adopting in-
tegration if we are persuaded by the economic case for doing so.
CONCLUSION
This Article has attempted to provide the first comprehensive
rationale for defending the current corporate income tax. It argues
that the usual reasons given for the tax (primarily as an indirect
way of taxing shareholders, or alternatively as a form of benefit
tax) are inadequate. It then explains what the original rationale to
adopt this tax was in 1909, namely to regulate managerial power.
This rationale stems from the real view of the corporation, which
was the dominant view throughout the many transformations of
the corporate form from Roman times to the present. Turning to
normative argument, this Article then argues that the regulatory
rationale given for taxing corporations in 1909 is still valid since
similar social conditions continue to exist. Finally, this Article ar-
gues that this rationale is necessary from a normative perspective
2"* Cf. Herwig J. Schlunk, How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love Double Taxa-
tion, 79 Notre Dame L. Rev. 127 (2003) (arguing in favor of the double tax on benefit
grounds).
2 Avi-Yonah, Progressive Taxation, supra note 213, at 1412.
m Even the third possible method of integration, dividend deduction, which is rarely
adopted in practice, is consistent with the above rationale insofar as the corporate tax
is reduced only if management relinquish power by distributing corporate assets.
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to support the fight against the two crucial current threats to the
corporate tax posed by the corporate tax shelter and tax competi-
tion phenomena.
In the end, however, it must be emphasized that the function of
taxation is inherently limited. As the two quotes cited in the begin-
ning illustrate, the state wields enormous power through taxation,
but it is limited in its ability to use it by the fear of destroying or
unduly damaging institutions that are essential to the welfare of its
citizens. Corporate taxation is an important regulatory tool and an
important element in managing the delicate balance between cor-
porations, society, and the state. But because all taxation is to some
extent harmful (in the sense of creating welfare loss), taxation can-
not be the only mechanism to solve social problems. Ultimately, it
is up to all of us-as voters, as politicians, and as managers of cor-
porations-to find the right balance among these competing con-
siderations.
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